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Compensating Power:  An Analysis of Rents 
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry 
William A. Birdthistle* 
Recent allegations of malfeasance in the investment management industry—market-
timing, late-trading, revenue-sharing, and several others—involve a broad range of mutual fund 
operations.  This Article seeks to explain the common source of these irregularities by focusing 
upon a trait they share:  the practice of investment advisers’ capitalizing upon their managerial 
influence to increase assets under management in order to generate greater fees from those 
assets.  This Article extends theories of executive compensation into the context of investment 
management to understand the extraction of rents by mutual fund advisers.  Investment advisers, 
as collective groups of portfolio managers, interact with the boards of trustees of mutual funds 
in ways analogous to the dealings of business executives with corporate boards of directors.  In 
this setting, the managerial power hypothesis of executive compensation provides a useful 
paradigm for understanding distortions in arm’s-length bargaining between investment advisers 
and fund boards, as well as limitations of the market’s ability to ensure optimal contracting 
between those parties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the wake of the heaviest outpouring of criticism in its history, 
the investment management industry has been punished with 
handsome profits and proposals for a lucrative future stream of Social 
Security revenues.  The year following New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer’s September 2003 accusation of malfeasance in mutual 
funds was truly an annus horribilis for those funds and the financial 
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houses that invest the funds’ money.1  Prior to Spitzer’s announcement, 
investment advisers2—firms of professional money managers who 
collectively manage more than $7 trillion in assets and advise more 
than 8000 mutual funds3—had enjoyed general approbation for the 
way in which they ran their businesses.4  Indeed, while much of 
corporate America suffered through its own outbreak of accounting 
malfeasance, commentators hailed mutual funds (owned by ninety-one 
million investors living in nearly half of all U.S. households5) and their 
unique structure as models of corporate governance.6  Spitzer’s press 
conference, however, triggered an unceasing tide of opprobrium, 
which has flowed over the investment management industry and 
befouled its reputation. 
 But as the market has recuperated since then, the indignation has 
ebbed.  Shareholders seem to have forgiven any enormities and 
returned to invest anew and to share in the funds’ success.7  Yet 
structural flaws in the industry remain.  And with the tremendous 
amount of assets invested in mutual funds, spiced with the possibility 
that Social Security reform might some day direct an additional $65 
billion into personal fund accounts each year,8 the late transgressions 
                                                 
 1. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State 
Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release, Eliot 
Spitzer], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. 
 2. Although the term “investment adviser” may be understood colloquially to refer 
to an individual who manages money, the term as used in the mutual fund industry and this 
Article refers to a professional business organization staffed by such individuals.  The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) defines “investment adviser” to mean “any 
person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value 
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities” and 
“person” to mean “a natural person or a company.”  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. 
No. 768, §§ 202(a)(11), (16), 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11), (16) 
(2000)).  It is in the latter sense of a company that this Article uses the term “investment 
adviser.” 
 3. See INV. CO. INST., 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1, 13 (44th ed. 2004). 
 4. See Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Independent Directors:  A Model for 
Corporate America?, PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 2003, at 2, 12. 
 5. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 79-80. 
 6. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 2, 12. 
 7. See, e.g., Laura Johannes, Strong Performers Suffer Less in Mutual-Fund 
Scandals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C1; David Serchuk, Fund Companies:  After the Fall, 
FORBES, Jan. 14, 2005, available at http://www.forbes.com/strategies/2005/01/14/cz_ds_ 
0114sf.html (“More than a year after the mutual fund industry got into trouble for late-trading 
and market-timing practices, shares of some of the offending fund companies have bounced 
back nicely.”). 
 8. See Tom Lauricella, In Bush Plan, Who Will Do the Managing?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
4, 2005, at C1 (“Robert Pozen, chairman of MFS Funds and a member of the presidential 
commission that backed private accounts, estimates that about $65 billion will flow into the 
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compel a serious appraisal of the industry’s architectural vulnera-
bilities. 
 After presenting an introduction to the charges against mutual 
funds, the unique structures of these funds, and the dynamics at work 
in the alleged malfeasance, this Article in Part II provides background 
on the components and organization of the investment management 
industry, beginning with a brief history of its development in the 
United States and a discussion of the rationales that encourage 
investment in pooled vehicles.  Part III argues that the relationship 
between mutual fund boards of trustees and the investment advisers 
that those boards hire can best be understood within the paradigm of 
executive compensation.  Part III then considers what the prevailing 
model of executive compensation, the optimal contracting approach, 
might predict when deployed in the investment advisory context.  Part 
IV explores the limitations of the optimal contracting approach and, 
finding that theory wanting, suggests that another theoretical approach, 
the managerial power hypothesis, which has heretofore been confined 
to the operating company9 context, might apply with equal or greater 
force in the mutual fund setting.  Part V examines the malfeasance 
exposed by the recent industry investigations and argues that the 
behavior in question can best be understood as camouflaged extraction 
of compensation from fund shareholders.  The Article concludes that 
recently proposed and adopted regulatory reforms are, and will 
continue to be, inadequate to the task of vitiating the influence of 
investment advisers and the conflicts of interest that currently pervert 
those advisers’ incentives to the detriment of shareholders. 
                                                                                                             
industry executives have an incentive to diminish estimates of potential inflows to avoid 
appearing rapacious.  Conversely, opponents of Social Security reform have an incentive to 
inflate the figures to suggest that reforms involving personal accounts are driven by the 
financial industry’s desire for profit.  Other estimates suggest that $75 billion or more would 
flow into personal accounts.  See Peter Bucci, Bush Plan Could Add $75B to Funds 
Annually, IGNITES, Nov. 8, 2004, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20041108/bushplan_ 
could-funds.annually (“Ken Worthington, an analyst at CIBC World Markets, expects 100 
million of 130 million taxpayers to invest some of their Social Security money in private 
accounts.  Contributions will likely average $750 a year, assuming an annual cap of $1,000.  
In comparison, he says, the fund industry took in some $200 billion annually from 1996 to 
2003.”). 
 9. The term “operating company” is used in the investment management industry—
and this Article—to refer to a typical company other than an investment company or mutual 
fund; that is, a company outside the investment management business whose primary purpose 
is the provision of goods or services and not simply the investment of assets.  Cf. Investment 
Company Act of 1940, § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000) (setting forth the definition 
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 In the past two and a half years, federal and state investigators 
have alleged that investment advisers—including many of the most 
well-respected firms in the business, such as Putnam Investments 
(Putnam), Alliance Capital (Alliance), and Massachusetts Financial 
Services (MFS), to name but a few—have indulged in a feast of 
abuses, including illicitly abetting private investors in arbitraging 
mutual funds to the detriment of other fund shareholders;10 failing to 
“fair value” the worth of assets under their management;11 permitting 
favored shareholders to buy and sell fund shares illegally after the daily 
trading deadline;12 selectively disclosing the holdings of securities in 
their funds’ portfolios to preferred clients;13 appropriating shareholder 
assets to boost fund sales and, in turn, their own advisory fees;14 and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, destroying evidence of the aforementioned 
abuses.15 
 Spitzer sounded the first ominous note on September 3, 2003, 
when he held a press conference to announce a complaint alleging the 
                                                 
 10. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347, 82 SEC Docket 341 (Feb. 5, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm. 
 11. See, e.g., Alison Sahoo, SEC Probe:  Pricing Problems Widespread, IGNITES, 
Mar. 24, 2004, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040324/probe_pricing_problems_ 
widespread (“More than half of the 961 global funds and 219 complexes that responded 
to an SEC inquiry letter used fair-valuation procedures less than f ive times in the 
past 20 months.  Another 277 funds, or 31% of the respondents, didn’t use fair 
valuation at all during that time.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas & Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Closes Mutual Fund 
Intermediary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at C1 (“The regulators in the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency coordinated their decision to close Security Trust with Mr. 
Spitzer’s office and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which both announced their 
own actions yesterday.  The S.E.C. accused the company and three former executives of 
facilitating hundreds of illegal trades by hedge funds managed by Edward J. Stern, who 
reached a settlement with Mr. Spitzer in early September.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks Before the ICI General Membership Meeting (May 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch052004pfr.htm (“In addition, as the fund industry was 
resisting efforts to require more frequent disclosure of mutual fund portfolio holdings, some 
management firm personnel allegedly were selectively disclosing portfolio information that 
was later used to trade against their funds and harm their investors.”); Deborah Brewster, SEC 
Hits Out at Mutual Funds’ Credibility Gap, FIN. TIMES (London), May 21, 2004, at 19 
(reporting on Paul Roye’s announcement that some firms “were selectively disclosing 
portfolio holdings”). 
 14. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fifteen Firms To Pay over 
$21.5 Million in Penalties To Settle SEC and NASD Breakpoints Charges (Feb. 12, 2004) 
[hereinafter Press Release, SEC], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-17.htm. 
 15. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Tom Lauricella & John Hechinger, Former Fred 
Alger Official Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at C1 (“But on Sept. 4, Mr. Connelly 
allegedly told a subordinate to ‘delete certain e-mails,’ and directed her to instruct three other 
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complicity of several major fund groups in illegal market-timing and 
late-trading.16  In the year following that dramatic press conference, 
barely a week passed during which the industry escaped accusations of 
yet more transgressions.17 
 Within days of Spitzer’s announcement, a pack of governing 
agencies had loosed investigations of their own upon the investment 
advisory business.18  Indeed, within just a matter of months, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had issued Wells 
notices,19 conducted depositions, and even reached settlements in 
several of its investigations.20  The aggregated penalties, fines, and fee 
reductions levied against the investment advisers in just two of those 
early settlements amounted to almost $1 billion.21  Since then, other 
federal regulators and a posse of state agencies have joined the SEC in 
conducting investigations into dozens of fund complexes, and the 
aggregate amount paid to settle investigations has climbed to many 
billions of dollars.22 
 In addition, the SEC quickly proposed and adopted a litany of 
new rules aimed at patching the industry’s ethical leaks.  These 
regulations call for broader disclosure with respect to pricing 
                                                 
 16. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, supra note 1. 
 17. Until September 2005, the industry publication, Ignites, maintained on its Web 
site a “Scandal Timeline,” which in the first year following Spitzer’s press conference, from 
September 3, 2003, to September 3, 2004, listed 204 separate entries.  E-mail from Chris 
Frankie, Managing Editor, Ignites, to Hannah Campbell, Tulane Law Review, in New 
Orleans, La. (Jan. 25, 2006) (on file with the Tulane Law Review). 
 18. See Brooke A. Masters, Mutual Fund Abuses Alleged in Two Cases, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 17, 2003, at E1. 
 19. After conducting an investigation into alleged wrongdoing, but prior to 
recommending that the Commission approve an enforcement action, the staff of the SEC will 
(in a Wells notice) typically provide defendants with one final opportunity (through a Wells 
submission) to persuade the staff to change its recommendation.  The process derives its 
popular name from John Wells, the Chair of an Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies 
and Practices that published a report in 1972 recommending this procedure.  See LOUIS LOSS 
& JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1481-84 (5th ed. 2004). 
 20. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 14. 
 21. The settlement orders, formalized as SEC releases, set forth the underlying 
allegations and any penalties or fines to which investment advisers have agreed.  See Alliance 
Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2205A, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket 3401 (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/ia-2205a.htm (setting forth a penalty of $250 million, excluding additional 
fee reductions and settlements aggregating to $600 million); Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Investment Company Act Release No. 26347 
(Feb. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (setting forth a 
total settlement of $225 million). 
 22. Hank Ezell, Mutual Fund Cleanup Gets Good Reviews, ATL. J. CONST., Aug. 29, 





2006] THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 1407 
 
discounts,23 codes of ethics,24 investment company governance,25 and 
new compliance programs,26 among almost a score of topics.  The self-
regulating organizations have also sharpened their pencils, with the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) issuing new corporate governance rules to 
their members.27  Congress, too, stoked the legislative machinery, 
holding numerous committee hearings on the matter and voting on 
bills aimed at addressing the growing list of complaints.28 
 Of course, the civil bar never long remains ignorant of plumes of 
smoke emanating from regulatory investigations; plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have commenced an eager hunt for fire of their own.  They have 
already filed more than one hundred civil law suits—both class actions 
and derivative suits—against dozens of investment advisers, funds, and 
trustees.29 
 What has been remarkable about this decline and fall is not so 
much its speed but the pedigree of its tragic hero:  the mutual fund 
industry boasted a largely celebrated history reaching back eighty 
years.  Ostensibly, the investment management business benefits from 
many of the textbook safeguards designed to guarantee the integrity of 
any financial industry and to permit optimal contracting amongst all 
parties. 
 First, mutual fund boards boast high percentages of independent 
trustees, who are charged with bargaining at arm’s length with 
investment advisers on behalf of fund shareholders.30  Second, the 
industry comprises more than 8000 different funds, and competition 
                                                 
 23. See Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,262, 33,263-65 (June 14, 2004). 
 24. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
2256, Investment Company Act Release No. 26492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,696 (July 9, 
2004). 
 25. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 26. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 
Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,715-23 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 27. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 1. 
 28. See Stephen Labaton, House Backs Bill To Overhaul Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2003, at C1 (reporting the U.S. House of Representatives’ vote of 418-2 to approve 
legislation “aimed at deterring trading abuses and fund mismanagement, improving the 
disclosure of fee information and increasing the independence of fund boards”). 
 29. See, e.g., Complaint, Hammerslough v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., No. 04-CV-1185 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2004) (a derivative action consolidated as part of the multidistrict litigation 
of market timing and related claims involving several fund complexes, such as Alger, 
Columbia, Janus, MFS, One Group, Putnam, and Allianz Dresdner). 
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for the 91 million investing shareholders would appear to be robust.31  
With scores of investment advisers competing for more than $7 trillion 
in assets,32 one would be hard pressed to imagine a more vigorous 
marketplace.  Third, both investment advisers and investment 
companies are heavily regulated by several important federal 
regulations, including not only the Securities Act of 193333 (the 
Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 193434 (the 
Exchange Act) but also the Investment Advisers Act of 194035 (the 
Advisers Act), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act),36 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley).37  Furthermore, 
the industry is also governed by specific provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code38 (the Code) and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).39  Largely as a consequence of the 
stringency of these regulations, the industry is obliged to disclose vast 
quantities of information about mutual funds and their advisers.  In 
annual reports, semi-annual reports, prospectuses, statements of 
additional information, certified shareholder reports, and several other 
regularly required disclosure documents, advisers must, in extensive 
detail, lay bare the fees, performance histories, investment strategies, 
and risks of the funds they manage.  For any given mutual fund, the 
disclosure documents filed with the SEC annually may easily amount 
to several hundred pages.  Fourth, many of the shareholders in these 
funds are not simply passive retirees; they are sophisticated and 
powerful governmental pension plans, university endowments, and 
frequently other mutual funds, each aggressively pursuing its own 
interest with a full-time staff of highly educated and well-informed 
managers.  Finally, shareholders of mutual funds, like any other 
                                                 
 31. See id. at 13, 79-80. 
 32. See id. at 79. 
 33. Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa 
(2000)). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-
21). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-
64).  The Investment Company Act is often colloquially referred to as either the Company Act 
or, with apparent disregard for the fact that the Advisers Act was passed in the same year, the 
1940 Act. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West 2005)). 
 38. 26 U.S.C. § 4982(a)-(f) (2000). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered 
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investors, have access to the courts to pursue legal remedies to void 
any advisory agreements that are adverse to their pecuniary interests. 
 With such an arsenal of structural protections, the investment 
management industry should have proven largely immune to inept 
governance and distortions in optimal contracting amongst its 
constituent parties.  Then whence, one must ask, came this collapse? 
 While the soothing effects of a market rebound appear to have 
cooled the interest of some investors in seeking an answer to that 
question, the amounts of money at stake are simply too significant to 
ignore.  Settlements and fines in the first year of investigations alone 
amounted to many billions of dollars, and those amounts are very 
likely to grow significantly through civil litigation.40  Moreover, those 
sums could be dwarfed by the billions and even trillions of dollars in 
revenues that some analysts believe Social Security reform would 
bring to the industry.41  If mutual funds are truly as susceptible to 
malfeasance as the broad array of regulatory investigations would 
suggest, surely the time to understand those vulnerabilities is now, 
prior to the emergence of new irregularities and before the arrival of 
substantial inflows of money magnifies the problem. 
 This Article argues that the industry’s faults can be found in the 
idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the 
ability of managers to wield substantial power and to use that power to 
extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from shareholders.42   
 The very structure of mutual funds lays them open to such 
abuses.  The typical mutual fund is a rudimentary legal vessel into 
which shareholders contribute money and over which a board of 
trustees governs; the fund has no offices, no equipment, and no 
employees.43  Instead, all the functions that a fund needs to perform in 
order to achieve its basic mission—which is, essentially, to increase the 
value of each shareholder’s investment—are performed by third 
parties.44  The most important of these service providers is the entity 
that manages the fund’s investment portfolio, the investment adviser. 
 The investment adviser enters into an advisory agreement with 
the fund, represented by the fund’s board of trustees, pursuant to which 
the adviser agrees to manage the fund’s money in exchange for a fee 
                                                 
 40. See Ezell, supra note 22. 
 41. See Lauricella, supra note 8; Bucci, supra note 8. 
 42. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004) (describing the structure of mutual funds and the incentives and 
conflicts facing managers and brokers). 
 43. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 2. 
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calculated as a percentage of the assets under management.  In 
essence, the investment adviser serves as the entire management and 
all the personnel of the fund.  If a fund—that is, its board of trustees—
is unhappy with the investment adviser’s performance, there is but one 
contractual recourse:  to terminate the advisory agreement.  The board 
is heavily constrained from hiring or firing particular executives or 
portfolio managers who work for the investment adviser because those 
individuals report directly only to their own company’s board of 
directors. 
 Termination of an advisory agreement, however, would have a 
devastating effect on the fund.  To change the investment adviser of a 
fund would be to change the very nature of the fund and to nullify an 
essential reason many shareholders have invested in the fund:  namely, 
to obtain the services of a particular investment adviser.  When 
thousands of shareholders flocked to the Magellan Fund in its 
heyday—the period during which it rose 2700% between 1977 and 
199045—many of them were not merely hoping to aggregate their 
monies with other shareholders; rather, they were specifically seeking 
the wisdom of Peter Lynch, the celebrated portfolio manager who had 
won superlative returns on shareholder investments.  Magellan’s board 
might have believed, therefore, that to replace Lynch and Fidelity 
Investments with another adviser would have been to convert the fund 
into a completely different investment choice.  Rather, the board might 
conclude that, if shareholders are unhappy with their investment 
adviser, they do not need to wait for the fund’s board to provide a 
remedy; the shareholders have a remedy of their own at their ready 
disposal:  they can simply redeem their shares and leave the fund.  Of 
course, the ability to redeem is useful to shareholders only if they 
know when to do so.  Many shareholders, however, may not be paying 
close attention to whether their adviser is extracting insupportable fees, 
either because they are unwilling or unable to monitor the situation or 
because they are receiving sufficiently large returns from the fund not 
to mind losing out on additional gains.  Either way, many shareholders 
may not exit a fund even when it may be in their interest to do so.  In 
any event, the termination of advisory agreements is so rare as to be 
practically nonexistent.  This limitation severely restricts the ability of 
                                                 
 45. See Stephen Schurr, A Little Knowledge Can Often Be a Dangerous Thing, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 2004, at 12 (“I am awestruck by [Lynch’s] genius as a money 
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a fund’s board to control the management of the fund.  Investment 
advisers are well aware of this limitation. 
 Typically, the only recourse open to a board is for its members to 
make their displeasure known publicly, in an attempt to embarrass an 
uncooperative investment adviser or to invite the possibility of SEC 
scrutiny of the adviser.  Particularly in the current climate of 
heightened regulatory oversight, the threat of such action by a board 
certainly can restore some balance of power with the investment 
adviser.  Advisers are therefore not completely free to impose their 
unchecked will in the annual negotiations with a fund board.  
Accordingly, if an adviser wishes to extract rents without triggering 
board outrage, it may have to camouflage its behavior—that is, an 
investment adviser may attempt to obtain greater-than-optimal value 
from shareholders without being detected. 
 In the unique structure of investment companies, advisers are 
essentially surrogate executives to mutual funds, and advisory 
agreements govern their compensation.  And, as has been argued in the 
study of executive compensation,46 though not before in the mutual 
fund context, a substantial degree of managerial power may distort 
optimal contracting and permit managers to extract rents.  In this 
setting, advisers wield a great deal of managerial power and often use 
that power to extract value from shareholders beyond what has been 
negotiated in the advisory contract.  Indeed, this novel application of 
the managerial power hypothesis demonstrates that the alleged 
transgressions are best understood as camouflaged attempts by 
advisers to mine rents from fund shareholders. 
II. THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY INDUSTRY 
A. A Brief History of Mutual Funds 
 The notion of pooling money into a common investment fund is 
not a new one.  Indeed, European financiers have been investing in 
mutual funds or their antecedents for hundreds of years.47  In Britain, 
                                                 
 46. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 843-49 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David L. Walker, 
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 751, 785 (2002); cf. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:  
Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 857-69 
(2002) (arguing that managers extract greater compensation through the undervalued 
“perceived cost” of stock option incentives as opposed to managerial power). 
 47. Dustin Woodard, The History of Mutual Funds, http://mutualfunds.about.com/cs/ 
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Parliament authorized the earliest formal authority in the Anglo-
American legal tradition for such vehicles when it passed the Joint 
Stock Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867.48  These two laws created the 
first opportunity for investors, “to share in the profits of an investment 
enterprise” while “limit[ing] investor liability to the amount of 
investment capital devoted to the enterprise.”49 
 Soon thereafter, in 1868, London witnessed the founding of the 
Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, which proclaimed its ability 
to offer “the investor of moderate means the same advantages as the 
large capitalist . . . by spreading the investment over a number of 
different stocks.”50  More than fifty years later, on March 21, 1924, 
three Boston financiers at last gave America its first mutual fund:  
Massachusetts Investors Trust.51  In its inaugural year, the trust grew 
from $50,000 to $392,000 in assets.52  Now, eighty years later, 
Massachusetts Investors Trust is a $5.3 billion fund.53 
 Despite the dramatic growth of the first American trust in its 
debut year, this novel investment approach was not immediately 
celebrated:  by the close of 1929, the entire industry amounted to no 
more than $140 million.54  The stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing 
Great Depression continued to inhibit growth of mutual funds.  In the 
course of the next decade, however, the passage of a series of 
foundational securities laws helped to restore the confidence of 
investors:  first came the Securities Act in 1933,55 then the Exchange 
                                                 
 48. See The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.); The Companies Act, 
1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131 (Eng.); see also INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 4 (describing a 
brief history of mutual funds). 
 49. INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Mass. Investors Trust, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form N-1A), pt. IV (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/63091/000095015604000074/d604691.txt (“MFS is America’s oldest mutual fund 
organization.  MFS and its predecessor organizations have a history of money management 
dating from the founding of this fund in 1924.”). 
 52. Woodard, supra note 47. 
 53. See MFS Investment Management Home Page, www.mfs.com (follow “Products 
and Performance” hyperlink; then follow “Mutual Funds” hyperlink; then follow 
“Massachusetts Investors Trust” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).  Massachusetts 
Investors Trust is also centrally involved in the recent industry investigations, having been 
named as one of ten funds advised by MFS that the SEC believes were market-timed.  See 
Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213 (Feb. 5, 2004), Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26347, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213. 
htm. 
 54. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 5. 
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Act in 1934,56 then, in 1940, both the Advisers Act57 and the Investment 
Company Act.58 
 Ten years later, in 1951, the total number of funds exceeded one 
hundred, and the number of shareholder accounts exceeded one 
million.59  In 1954, the stock market finally rose above its 1929 peak, 
and by the end of that decade, the industry comprised 155 mutual 
funds with $4.3 million in shareholder accounts.60  Over the next five 
decades, the investment advisory industry enjoyed a sustained boom in 
the growth of mutual funds, spurred by the advent of index funds, 
which allowed investors to replicate in one security the entire breadth 
of a market metric (such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the 
Standard & Poors 500 Stock Index);61 the emergence of 401(k) 
accounts in the 1970s, which encouraged employees to funnel tax-free 
savings to a limited buffet of investment options (frequently mutual 
funds) selected by their plan administrator;62 and the creation of 
                                                 
 56. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm). 
 57. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-
21). 
 58. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-
64). 
 59. See INV. INST. CO., supra note 3, at inside front cover. 
 60. INV. INST. CO., MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, inside front cover (41st ed. 2001). 
 61. See JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS:  NEW IMPERATIVES FOR 
THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 114-17 (1999). 
 62. One account of the origin of the 401(k) describes it as follows: 
In 1974, the first individual retirement accounts . . . were introduced, but the 
standards for qualification were strict, and they didn’t really catch on.  In the Tax 
Reform Act of 1978, legislators loosened things up a bit by allowing workers to 
contribute their cash bonuses to retirement savings accounts on a tax-deferred 
basis.  The wording of this clause, No. 401(k), was vague, and it attracted the 
attention of R. Theodore Benna, an employee-benefits consultant in Langhorne, 
Pennsylvania. 
 One Saturday afternoon in 1980, Benna, who was then thirty-nine years old, 
was helping one of his clients, a local bank, to redesign its employee pension plan 
when he had a thought.  If cash bonuses could be sheltered from tax under clause 
401(k), why couldn't regular income be sheltered in the same way?  There didn’t 
appear to be anything in the statute that specifically ruled it out.  “My approach 
was that if the code doesn’t say, ‘Thou shalt not,’ then thou should be able to” . . . .  
He designed a retirement plan that would allow employees to contribute a portion 
of their paychecks to a savings account on a pretax basis.  A few months later, 
Benna’s own firm, the Johnson Companies, launched the first 401(k) plan.  In 
November, 1981, the Internal Revenue Service gave Benna’s creation its official 
blessing.  With legal approval, the new savings plans spread rapidly, and by 1985 
more than ten million employees had one. 
Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on 
Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 52 n.151 (2002) (quoting John Cassidy, Striking It Rich, 
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Individual Retirement Accounts in the 1980s,63 which prompted yet 
more personal investing. 
 Today, there are more than 8000 U.S. mutual funds,64 which hold 
an aggregate of more than $7.4 trillion in assets.65  By way of 
comparison, the entire value of the outstanding equity of U.S. 
companies is $14 trillion.66 Approximately ninety-one million 
individuals residing in over fifty-three million households67 (that is, 
almost half of all U.S. households) and almost a fifth of all U.S. 
household assets68 are invested in mutual funds. 
B. Rationales for Investing in Pooled Vehicles 
 In just eighty years, mutual funds have thoroughly saturated the 
investment landscape, insinuating themselves into the entire spectrum 
of American portfolios.  What accounts for this broad appeal?  
Advocates of mutual funds69 typically point to three principal reasons 
for the allure of modern mutual funds to such a broad and deep 
segment of the U.S. population:  diversification of investments, 
professional asset management, and redemption upon demand.70 
1. Diversification of Investments 
 Financial advisers have long appreciated the salutary effects of 
diversification upon an investment portfolio.71  By spreading 
investments across a broad range of ventures, an investor can protect 
against the risk of any single one of those ventures failing.72  While 
such an approach may limit the possibility of fully enjoying the 
rewards of any single venture succeeding wildly, over the long term, 
                                                 
 63. See Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30:  A 
Retrospective, PERSPECTIVE (Inv. Co. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2005, at 1 (noting that 
“[i]ndividuals had $3.0 trillion in IRAs by the end of 2003”). 
 64. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), “[a]t the end of 2003, 
investors could choose from 8,126 U.S. mutual funds.”  INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13. 
 65. Id.  The total amount of assets in mutual funds at the end of 2003, according to 
the ICI, was $7.414 trillion.  Id. 
 66. See id. at 59. 
 67. See id. at 80 (“Household mutual fund owners represented 47.9 percent of all 
U.S. households in July 2003, down from 49.6 percent in 2002.”). 
 68. See id. 
 69. In this Article, references to the activities of “mutual funds” and “investment 
companies” are generally to open-end investment companies and not, unless stated otherwise, 
to closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, or unit investment trusts. 
 70. INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13-19. 
 71. See id. at 10. 
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diversification dampens the effects of outlying highs and lows, 
allowing investors to benefit from the seemingly ineluctable longer-
term trend toward economic appreciation.  Over the past fifty years, all 
the established financial benchmarks of the overall U.S. economy—
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, S & P 500 Index, Russell 
2000, and Wilshire 5000—have registered a steady increase in value.73 
 For the lone investor of modest means, however, achieving 
diversification without the assistance of mutual funds or similar pooled 
investment vehicles might prove impossible.  With only a few hundred 
dollars to invest, such an individual might be able to purchase single 
shares of just a few companies—certainly nothing like the well-
balanced portfolio contemplated by advocates of prudent 
diversification.  Investors who coordinate their efforts, however, can 
use the combined fund of millions or even billions of dollars to build a 
highly diversified set of investments, with each investor owning a pro 
rata share of the total fund.74  This approach is the fundamental 
technique of a mutual fund and is not limited merely to stocks but also 
encompasses bonds, foreign securities, derivatives, foreign currencies, 
short sales, swaps, shares of other funds, and a panoply of other 
investment strategies.75  Thus, one can use funds to diversify ownership 
not only of particular issuers or transactions but also of substantially 
different investment techniques. 
2. Professional Asset Management 
 Informal pools, formed by friends and acquaintances, may allow 
all participants to discuss and determine their investment decisions by 
                                                 
 73. See Dow Jones Averages, http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/?event=show 
Averages; Standard and Poors 500 Index Gains and Losses, http://www.efmoody. 
com/investments/returns.html; Russell 200 Historical Index, http//www.russell.com/common/ 
indexes/csvs/russell2000index_hist.csv; Wilshire Total Market (5000) Stock Index, 
http://www.neatideas.com/data/data/w5000M.htm. 
 74. Since the earliest British joint stock companies and before, investors have long 
appreciated that the freedom to amalgamate funds creates economies of scale and allows 
individual investors to purchase fractions of items that might not otherwise be divisible.  See 
INV. CO. INST. supra note 3, at 4.  A whaling ship, for instance, might have been a lucrative 
investment but surely also an expensive one.  Having a quarter of the necessary money would 
be worth nothing, for a quarter of a boat would bring home nothing.  With three likeminded 
patrons, however, one could venture to own a quarter of all the oil, baleen, spermaceti, and 
ambergris the ship might carry. 
 75. As just one example, the MFS fund complex offers more than sixty-five funds, 
among which are the MFS West Virginia Municipal Bond Fund, the MFS International 
Diversification Fund, and the MFS Utilities Fund.  See MSF Investment Management, 
http://www.mfs.com (follow “Products & Performance” hyperlink; then follow “Mutual 
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consensus, but that approach would be impossible for a formal mutual 
fund.  In order for such a complex organism to function effectively, its 
shareholders must delegate the full-time business of making 
investment decisions to an individual or a team of specialists.  In the 
case of investment companies, the portfolio managers of a professional 
investment adviser research and choose when to buy and sell securities 
on behalf of the entire fund.  This professional management is 
frequently touted as one of the paramount advantages of an actively 
managed mutual fund.76 
 By purchasing shares of a mutual fund and agreeing to pay 
administrative fees associated with those shares, investors essentially 
hire professional money managers to invest their money.  For investors 
who have neither the time, the expertise, nor the inclination to manage 
their own funds, the attraction of such an approach is considerable.  
And with a modicum of research, any shareholder can determine the 
track record of a particular investment adviser—or even of an 
individual portfolio manager who works for that adviser—with respect 
to any of the mutual funds that the adviser or portfolio manager 
oversees.77  Of course, as we are constantly reminded, past performance 
is no guarantee of future results, but millions of investors nevertheless 
express their confidence by investing with money managers who have 
established successful track records. 
3. Redemption upon Demand 
 As important as the decision of which investment to put money 
into is the ability to get money out, preferably with profits in tow.  The 
exit strategy is a serious consideration with any investment, and 
investors frequently must pay a premium for the ability to extricate 
themselves with the minimum of bother or delay.  Liquidity—that is, 
                                                 
 76. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 9.  An “actively managed” mutual fund is one 
in which portfolio managers personally research, select, and monitor the fund’s investments; 
this type of fund is far more expensive to operate than, for instance, an index fund, whose 
investment decisions are made by a computer algorithm programmed simply to track the 
holdings of a market index, such as the S & P 500.  Because no ongoing human involvement 
is required to manage the latter, such funds typically bear lower advisory fees.  See id. 
 77. Investors can purchase information on specific funds from commercial third-
party information purveyors, such as Morningstar, http://www.morningstar.com and Lipper, 
http://www.lipperweb.com, but can also use free, publicly available sources, such as the 
SEC’s Web site, which includes links to all filings made on the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR).  EDGAR includes all mutual fund prospectuses 
and SAIs, which include large quantities of data on each registered fund.  See SEC Filings & 
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the ability to exit from an investment upon relatively short notice—is 
influenced by a number of factors.78 
 Often, issuers of securities will offer an enhanced return in 
exchange for an investor’s agreeing to leave his or her money 
untouched for longer periods of time.  Certificates of deposit and 
treasury bills reflect this premium by offering higher interest rates 
commensurate with longer term notes.  Hedge funds, too, will 
frequently reward investors who agree to lock up their funds for years 
by charging those investors lower management or performance fees.79  
Securities regulations also impose time restrictions upon the resale of 
certain securities or, alternatively, condition the resale of securities 
upon registration with the SEC, a process that adds not only time but 
significant expense.  Outside the realm of securities transactions, one 
can easily appreciate the illiquidity of certain investments, such as 
purchasing a house.  If an owner wishes to flip a property as soon as 
possible, nothing will guarantee the immediate appearance of a ready 
buyer willing to purchase the property for an amount at which the 
owner values it. 
 Mutual funds offer investors a highly liquid investment vehicle by 
guaranteeing the redemption of shares upon demand.  Subject to a few 
limitations,80 mutual funds guarantee their shareholders, on any given 
business day, the right to put shares back in the fund and to receive 
cash in exchange for them.81  Thus, fund shareholders are never locked 
into an investment from which they cannot readily extricate themselves 
on short notice. 
C. The Structure of a Mutual Fund Complex 
 For such a ubiquitous investment option, mutual funds suffer 
from a great deal of misunderstanding.  Perhaps the most common 
misconception reflects a fundamental confusion about the architecture 
of mutual funds:  many people erroneously conflate the acquisition of 
                                                 
 78. Black’s Law Dictionary defines liquidity as the “quality or state of being readily 
convertible to cash” or “[t]he characteristic of having enough units in the market that large 
transactions can occur without substantial price variations.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 950 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 79. See Alexander M. Ineichen, Funds of Hedge Funds:  Industry Overview, 4 J. 
WEALTH MGMT., Mar. 22, 2002, at 47, 47-48; Ron S. Geffner, Deals on the Side, HEDGE 
FUND MANAGER, U.S. EAST COAST 2005, at 26-27. 
 80. For example, many mutual funds charge investors a fee to redeem their shares if 
those shares have been held for less than some minimum period.  See Mandatory 
Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,375A, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762, 11,763-64 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004). 
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shares of a mutual fund with an investment in the equity of an 
investment adviser.  In fact, mutual funds and their investment advisers 
are almost always two entirely separate legal entities.  Thus, a purchase 
of shares of Fidelity’s Magellan Fund is not a purchase of equity in 
Fidelity Investments.82  Indeed, investment advisers are frequently 
subsidiaries of large financial conglomerates and therefore closed to 
direct public investment.  Mutual funds are unique business 
organizations, and that fact accounts for the somewhat curious 
structure of the investment management industry. 
1. Investment Companies 
 At the heart of the industry’s structure lies the mutual fund or, as 
it is known more formally, the investment company.83  Investment 
companies are rather Spartan business organizations, consisting of 
little more than shareholders, cash, fund shares, a portfolio of 
investment securities, and trustees.  Shareholders contribute cash—
which is then used to acquire a portfolio of investment securities—in 
exchange for shares of the investment company, and trustees represent 
the interests of those shareholders.84  Typically, a company has no 
employees and no physical plant, property, or equipment.  Broadly 
speaking, the goal of every investment company is to try to increase 
the value of each shareholder’s investment.  In order to accomplish that 
                                                 
 82. The confusion surrounding this topic was at the heart of an issue raised during the 
Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.  At the time that 
he was a member of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Alito, who owned shares 
in Vanguard mutual funds, sat on a case in which the investment manager, Vanguard, 
appeared as a defendant.  During the confirmation hearings, some critics—who mistakenly 
assumed that a financial interest in a mutual fund is the same as a financial interest in that 
fund’s adviser—contended that Alito should have recused himself from the case.  Mutual 
funds and their advisers, however, are almost never the same entity.   
 Vanguard, however, is a rare exception to that rule, inasmuch as Vanguard, the 
investment adviser, is wholly owned by the Vanguard funds.  Thus, an owner of shares of 
Vanguard funds, such as Judge Alito, would in fact indirectly own a portion of Vanguard, the 
investment adviser.  Several ethics experts, however, argued that the size of Judge Alito’s 
ultimate ownership of the defendant in this instance was insignificant.  See, generally, Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, Democrats Press Court Designee Over Mutual Fund Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2005, at A22. 
 83. The 1940 Act definition of an “investment company” is lengthy and convoluted 
but covers, inter alia, “any issuer which . . . is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, 
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 84. The shares that an investor purchases to participate in the mutual fund are 
typically referred to as “fund shares,” whereas the securities in which the fund then invests 






2006] THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 1419 
 
mission, mutual fund trustees enter into contractual arrangements on 
behalf of their investment companies with a retinue of third-party 
service providers. 
 The conflation of investment advisers and investment companies 
is not entirely accidental.  Funds are almost always sponsored by 
investment advisers, who file the formation documents, pay the start-
up costs, register the shares, seed and incubate the fund, and select the 
trustees.  When provided the opportunity to give a name to a new 
investment company on a Secretary of State’s forms, few advisers 
forgo the opportunity to incorporate their own name into the title of the 
new fund.  Hence, there should be no mystery as to the identity of the 
adviser of, say, the Putnam Classic Equity Fund85 even though, 
technically, that fund could be advised by any investment adviser and 
is not an affiliate of Putnam.  Having developed a reputation from 
years of managing other mutual funds, however, Putnam wants to be 
sure future potential investors in the new fund know immediately who 
will be acting as its investment adviser. 
 Perhaps the most common business form chosen for new 
investment companies is the Massachusetts business trust.  This choice 
is explained partly by the industry’s heritage in Boston and partly by 
the rather peculiar idiosyncrasies of Massachusetts state law.  The 
particular chapter of Massachusetts Code that provides for these trusts 
contains only fourteen sections86—compared to 222 for corporations.87  
This relative dearth of regulation is one of the primary attractions of 
Massachusetts business trusts.  Against this less burdensome 
regulatory backdrop, founders of trusts are at liberty to devise many of 
their own rules for the new organizations and to codify those 
preferences in the formation documents:  the declaration of trust and 
by-laws.  These governing principles are legally valid provided they do 
not conflict with state or federal securities regulations, though of 
course, ultimately, shareholders must be willing to accept them.  
Again, Massachusetts state law leaves the canvas largely blank for the 
initial shareholders of a trust.88  And, typically, at its inception, a trust’s 
shares are owned by only one initial shareholder:  the investment 
                                                 
 85. See Putnam Equity Fund, Registration Statement (Form N-1A), at 4-6 (Mar. 29, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/930748/000092881604000243/ 
cef1.txt. 
 86. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 182, §§ 1-14 (LexisNexis 2005) (entitled “Voluntary 
Associations and Certain Trusts”). 
 87. Id. ch. 156D, §§ 1.01-17.04 (LexisNexis 2005) (entitled “Business Corpora-
tions”). 
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adviser.  As long as the investment company’s governing principles 
comport with state law (which is usually quite lenient) and federal 
securities regulation (which is somewhat less so), the investment 
adviser can draft them with a free hand, subject to what the market will 
bear.89 
 Once the investment company is formed and its shares registered 
with the SEC, the sponsoring investment adviser will typically seed the 
fund with at least $100,000 and assign a portfolio manager to manage 
the portfolio as though it were a public mutual fund.90  This period of 
incubation allows the investment adviser to train portfolio managers 
and to assess the efficacy of the fund’s particular investment strategy.  
When the adviser is ready, it will open the fund and then market the 
fund’s shares to the investing public. 
2. Fund Shareholders 
 Shareholders typically purchase fund shares from the investment 
company itself and, when they are ready to sell, put those shares back 
into the company.91  This approach contrasts with the manner in which 
shares of public operating companies are traded, where the majority of 
investors purchase shares not from the company itself—a transaction 
that occurs only in the comparatively rare event of an initial public or 
follow-on offering—but from current shareholders of the issuer’s stock 
who are willing to sell.  Mutual fund shares, by contrast, are not 
typically traded among investors on a secondary exchange.92  Instead, 
the investment company offers a perpetual stream of its shares to any 
investors willing to purchase them; similarly, it must be prepared to 
redeem each of the shares it issues.93  Consequently, the registration 
statement for a mutual fund does not fix the number or value of shares 
                                                 
 89. In recent settlement agreements related to the industry abuses, however, the SEC 
has demanded, and several investment advisers have agreed to hold, shareholder meetings on 
a regular basis.  See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2213, Mass. Fin. Servs., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347, 82 SEC pocket 341 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (“Commencing in 2005 and not less than 
every fifth calendar year thereafter, each MFS Retail Fund will hold a meeting of 
shareholders at which the board of trustees will be elected.”).  
 90. See id. 
 91. Investors can make these purchases and sales either directly through the fund’s 
distributor or indirectly through retail brokerage houses.  Mutual fund prospectuses regularly 
contain information on how prospective investors can contact the fund’s distributor by 
telephone or the Internet. 
 92. Compare the shares of registered closed-end funds, which are regularly traded on 
stock exchanges. 





2006] THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 1421 
 
it wishes to issue but rather allows for the issuance of an infinite 
number of shares.94  As long as new investors pay fair value for their 
shares and exiting investors receive fair value for theirs, these comings 
and goings do not dilute or increase the value of any other share-
holder’s investment. 
 Because mutual fund shares are not traded on an exchange, their 
value does not turn on the subjective assessments of other investors in 
the marketplace.  Instead, the worth of each share is a simple fraction 
of the total value of the net assets of the fund.95  Shareholders purchase 
fund shares by paying the net asset value (NAV) per share and, in turn, 
receive NAV when redeeming fund shares.96  NAV is calculated by 
dividing the total value of a fund’s portfolio investments plus any other 
assets, minus any liabilities, by the total number of outstanding fund 
shares.  Funds are required to calculate their NAV daily, and typically 
they do so immediately after the close of business at 4:00 p.m. Eastern 
time.97 
 To illustrate, if a fund possessed cash in the amount of $11 
million and securities valued at $74 million, owed liabilities of $4 
million, and had 5 million outstanding shares, its NAV would be: 
 Cash plus other assets minus liabilities 
 $11 million + $74 million - $4 million Fund Share Price or 
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––– = Net Asset Value 
 5,000,000 $16.20 
 So with any appreciation or decline in the value of securities in a 
fund’s portfolio, the value of the shares of that fund will rise or fall 
accordingly. 
                                                 
 94. See id. at 16-17. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Rule 22c-1 of the 1940 Act sets forth the requirements for the daily pricing of 
mutual fund shares.  17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2005); see also Amendments to Rules 
Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 
Fed. Reg. 70,388, 70,388 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (proposing to amend current rules to the 
effect that an order to redeem or purchase fund shares would receive the current day’s price 
only if the order is received by the time the fund established for calculating its NAV).  
Violating the 4:00 p.m. deadline allows late traders to reap benefits at the expense of existing 
fund shareholders, whose gains are thereby diluted.  See Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading 
at Stale Prices with Modern Technology:  Policy Options for Mutual Funds in the Internet 
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3. The Board of Trustees 
 Representing the interests of the fund’s shareholders is the board 
of trustees.  In a fund’s earliest stages, the investment adviser, as the 
fund’s only shareholder, is in a position to appoint the trustees.  This 
power of appointment is not entirely unconstrained, as federal 
securities laws require that a majority of the members of the board be 
independent—that is, persons who are not affiliated with the 
investment adviser.98  In the aftermath of the industry’s recent 
upheavals, the SEC has passed new rules that allow advisers to take 
advantage of regulatory exemptions that have become critical to the 
running of a mutual fund only if the fund’s board increases its 
percentage of independent trustees to seventy-five percent of the 
board.99 
 Another quirk of the mutual fund industry that has no analog in 
the world of operating companies is that a single board of trustees may 
be responsible for the shareholders of many different funds.  
Investment advisers frequently manage the assets of multiple funds.  
Indeed, in some of the nation’s larger fund complexes, a single adviser 
manages more than one hundred funds.100  To be a shareholder in one 
fund does not necessarily mean that one is a shareholder in any other 
fund in a mutual fund complex; the only way to be a shareholder in 
each of those funds is to purchase shares in each particular fund.  As a 
practical matter, then, the populations of shareholders in separate funds 
sometimes overlap and sometimes remain entirely distinct.  
Shareholder distribution is simply a function of the investment choices 
individual shareholders make.  The same is not the case for the board 
of trustees.  Frequently, a single board of trustees serves all of the 
funds managed by a single adviser.  For the investment adviser, who 
wields the greatest degree of control in choosing the trustees, 
interacting with a single board affords great practical convenience.  For 
their services, board members are typically paid for participation in 
                                                 
 98. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000) 
(prohibiting an investment advisor from serving a mutual fund except pursuant to a contract 
that has been approved by a majority of trustees who are independent). 
 99. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 100. MFS, for instance, oversees a family of 71 funds, and Fidelity manages more than 
200 funds.  See MFS Investment Management, http://www.mfs.com (last visited Feb. 14, 
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board and committee meetings, and those costs are spread across all 
the funds in the complex represented by that board.101 
 The primary service that a board of trustees provides for the 
shareholders of a fund is overseeing the contractual arrangements 
between the funds governed by the board and the third parties that 
provide services to those funds.102  Specifically, a board will regularly 
monitor the performance of the service providers, meet annually to 
review their mutual funds’ contracts, and then negotiate to renew 
contracts with the service providers.103 
4. Service Providers to the Funds 
 As with practically all serious business enterprises, mutual funds 
hire external contractors to perform specialized tasks on their behalf.  
These service providers include the usual suspects, such as law firms 
and accounting firms and, when times are trying, public relations 
agencies.  Mutual funds also retain the services of a specialized group 
of four entities that perform the operations unique to the investment 
advisory business:  the investment adviser, the distributor, the transfer 
agent, and the custodian.104 
a. The Investment Adviser 
 The single most important service provider to a mutual fund is 
the company that serves as its investment adviser.  Indeed, as has been 
discussed,105 funds almost always owe their very existence to 
investment advisers, which create the funds and shepherd them 
through their formation and incubation.  Then, once a fund is fully 
operational, the adviser’s portfolio managers continue to make the 
critical investment decisions that determine whether shareholders 
realize a profit or loss on their fund shares.  In addition, advisers 
provide most of the personnel and administrative support the fund 
needs to conduct its business, from paying the fund’s bills, to 
compiling board materials and data that trustees need for their 
deliberations, to drafting regulatory filings in compliance with federal 
                                                 
 101. See Bonnie Bauman, ‘More Time, More Money’ for Directors in 2004, 
BOARDIQ, May 3, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print/20050503/more_time_more_ 
money_directors (subscription required). 
 102. INV. CO. INST. supra note 3, at 7-8. 
 103. See id. at 8-9. 
 104. See id. at 7 (but referring to a “distributor” as a “principal underwriter”). 
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securities laws.106  In essence, advisers provide life support to otherwise 
inert funds. 
 At the core of the adviser’s team of employees is a staff of senior 
portfolio managers, who are the professional money managers charged 
with investing the millions and sometimes billions of dollars pooled in 
the funds.107  At times, one portfolio manager will take ultimate 
responsibility for each fund; at others, a team of managers takes joint 
responsibility for the investment decisions.  Regardless of the strategy, 
portfolio managers are the stars of investment advisers, and are 
compensated accordingly. 
 The advisory agreements pursuant to which advisers provide 
their services to mutual funds and mutual funds pay those advisers are 
limited by law to one-year terms.108  Each year, then, the trustees must 
decide whether to renew a fund’s contract with its adviser.109  Although 
boards almost always renew these agreements, trustees must still 
undertake a process to review important contractual terms.110  One of 
the key provisions of every advisory agreement is the fee that the 
adviser will receive for rendering its services to the fund.  Federal 
regulations severely constrict the ability of advisers of mutual funds to 
earn compensation based on the performance of the funds they 
manage for fear of providing advisers with too strong an incentive to 
pursue aggressive investment strategies with the investments of 
shareholders insufficiently sophisticated to appreciate the risks.111  
Unlike hedge fund managers or venture capital firms, therefore, a 
mutual fund investment adviser does not receive a sizeable percentage 
of profits earned.  Instead, the adviser receives an advisory fee 
computed as a percentage of assets under management.112  Typically, 
advisory fees range from 20 to 200 basis points,113 depending on 
whether the fund is actively managed by investment personnel or 
governed by an automatic, computer-driven investment program, as 
                                                 
 106. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 8-10. 
 107. See Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,533, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,788, 
52,788-89 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
 108. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), (c) 
(2000). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c). 
 111. See id. § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1).  However, Rule 205-3 of the 
Advisor’s Act permits performance fees only if the investment advisor is entering into an 
agreement with a “qualified client.”  17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2005). 
 112. See Mahoney, supra note 42, at 167. 
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well as on the complexity of the securities in which the fund invests.114  
So, for a fund with average daily net assets of $2 billion, an adviser 
that charged 75 basis points would receive $15 million per year. 
 This payment structure reduces an adviser’s revenues to the 
product of a single multiplicand (the assets under management) and a 
single multiplier (the advisory fee).  In order to increase those 
revenues, therefore, the adviser has but two choices:  increase the 
advisory fees or increase the assets under management.  Fee increases, 
however, often require the consent of fund shareholders,115 the 
acquisition of which involves both practical and political difficulties, 
and are capped by what the market will bear.  Consequently, fee 
increases are constrained by practical, political, and economic forces 
and are, therefore, relatively uncommon. 
 Accordingly, the more common approach is to increase the assets 
under management, which an adviser can do also in one of two ways:  
by making wise investment decisions that increase the returns on a 
fund’s underlying portfolio securities or by persuading new and 
existing shareholders to invest more money in the fund.116   As long as 
the assets rise, either approach is equally effective mathematically.  
One could conceive of a fund closed to additional investment that 
nonetheless generates more and more revenue for the adviser simply 
on the strength of successful investment decisions.  On the other hand, 
one could also conceive of an investment adviser increasing its annual 
revenues without making any profitable investment decisions and, 
instead, simply recruiting new shareholders to the fund. 
 Although either scenario holds the potential for equivalent results 
for the adviser, the two lead to decidedly different consequences for 
shareholders:  growth in a fund achieved solely by increasing 
investments in the fund is not shared by shareholders.  For the 
shareholders in such a situation, the value of the fund’s shares that they 
hold remains stagnant or may even drop.  Theoretically, if a fund 
increases in size only through new investments, its shareholders may 
enjoy increased economies of scale but only to the extent that the 
adviser passes those savings back to shareholders, which is by no 
                                                 
 114. Brian K. Reid & John D. Rea, Mutual Fund Distribution Channels and 
Distribution Costs, PERSPECTIVES (Inv. Co. Inst., Wash. D.C.), July 2003, at 15 & fig. 11. 
 115. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c). 
 116. When new and existing shareholders make additional investments in a fund, they 
do not—in most circumstances—dilute the holdings of existing shareholders because they 
pay for the new shares they receive with new money.  Investments by market timers and late 
traders, however, are likely to dilute returns by existing shareholders.  See Ciccotello et al., 
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means certain.  Appreciating the divergence in the adviser’s interest 
and the shareholder’s interest is critical to understanding the crux of 
the recent allegations leveled against the advisers.117 
b. The Principal Underwriter or Distributor 
 Outside the investment management industry, when a typical 
operating company goes public, it will retain an underwriter or 
syndicate of underwriters to buy its shares first and then to distribute 
those shares to the wider public.118  The same principle holds true with 
mutual funds:  investment companies hire a principal underwriter, 
more commonly known as a distributor, to purchase its shares first and 
then to distribute them to the wider public.119  Because mutual funds 
are in a sense perpetually going public, however, their relationships 
with distributors last well beyond just the initial formation of the 
companies.  Indeed, as long as a mutual fund is open to investment, it 
relies upon a distributor to purchase and to distribute its shares.  And, 
as with the ongoing relationship with the investment adviser, the fund’s 
board of trustees must approve the contractual agreement between the 
fund and the distributor.120 
 Distributors distribute fund shares through two primary 
marketing channels:  one directly to potential fund shareholders, the 
other via collaborations with retail brokerage houses.  An investor can 
therefore purchase fund shares either by contacting the distributor 
directly, typically through a web site or toll-free number listed in the 
fund’s prospectus, or by executing a trade though the investor’s broker 
such as Charles Schwab, Morgan Stanley, or E*Trade.  To market to 
these two channels, distributors will purchase advertisements on 
television, radio, and other media, and will attempt to persuade 
brokers/dealers of the value of their funds’ shares. 
 For these efforts, distributors are compensated by payments out 
of the fund’s assets.  As a general rule, federal regulations significantly 
restrict the use of fund assets, but an express exception—Rule 12b-1 of 
the 1940 Act—provides for the shareholders’ funds to be used for the 
distribution of fund shares by, typically, paying a distributor.121  The 
rationale behind this exception is the notion that existing fund 
                                                 
 117. See generally Mahoney, supra note 42 (examining costs incurred by mutual fund 
shareholders as a result of agency problem). 
 118. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 73-91. 
 119. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 10. 
 120. See id. 
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shareholders may benefit when a fund attracts additional shareholders 
because larger funds with more assets are capable of enjoying 
economies of scale that are shared by all shareholders.122  Thus, 
shareholders are assessed distribution fees, more commonly called 
12b-1 fees, to finance the distributor’s efforts in selling more shares of 
the fund. 
 These 12b-1 fees are calculated in much the same way as 
advisory fees:  the distributor is paid a certain number of basis points 
on the fund’s assets under management.123  If, for instance, the 12b-1 
fee for a $500 million fund is 25 basis points, the distributor would 
receive $1.25 million per year.  And, as do investment advisers, 
distributors therefore have a strong financial incentive to increase the 
assets of the funds for which they work.  Unlike investment advisers, 
however, distributors are not involved in investment decisions and 
therefore cannot increase the fund’s assets through prudent money 
management.  All a distributor can do to increase its own revenue is to 
increase the inflow of new investments to the fund. 
c. The Transfer Agent 
 As is the case with any public company, the maintenance of 
accurate records of who owns what shares in an investment company 
is a vital back-office function.  Funds typically hire a transfer agent to 
provide this service and to take care of the concomitant tasks of 
calculating interest and disbursing capital gains and interest for fund 
shareholders.124  Transfer agents are usually also responsible for 
mailing account statements, tax materials, and prospectuses and other 
required disclosure documents to fund shareholders.125  A board of 
trustees will typically approve an administrative services agreement 
that governs the relationship of a fund and its transfer agent. 
                                                 
 122. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380 (Aug. 2, 2004).  Whether shareholders do, in fact, share 
in these economies of scale is uncertain.  Certainly, when advisers fail to pass the savings 
back to shareholders, as is discussed in the breakpoint section below, investors realize no such 
savings.  Some commentators have questioned whether shareholders receive these savings 
even in the absence of malfeasance.  See, e.g., John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual 
Fund Advisory Fees:  The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 619-27 (2001) 
(suggesting that the breakpoints do not capture the economies of scale). 
 123. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 164-65. 
 124. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 11. 





1428 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1401 
 
d. The Custodian 
 The most important asset of an investment company is its 
portfolio of underlying securities and investments.  By law, investment 
companies are required to protect those securities by entrusting them 
to a custodian.126  Custodians are typically large banks that are 
accustomed to complying with the extensive regulatory regime that 
governs the protection of investments.127  For example, the SEC 
requires that the custodian segregate mutual fund portfolio securities 
from any other assets held by the custodian.128 
 As we have seen, in order to carry on the business of a mutual 
fund, investment companies must contract with these four important 
service providers:  the investment adviser, the distributor, the transfer 
agent, and the custodian.129  If this nexus of contractual relationships 
appears convoluted and sprawling, it may simplify things to bear in 
mind that frequently all these third parties are affiliates of one another.  
For instance, the Dreyfus Premier Growth and Income Fund retains 
Dreyfus Corporation as its investment adviser, Dreyfus Service 
Corporation as its distributor, Dreyfus Transfer, Inc., as its transfer 
agent, and Mellon Bank, N.A., as its custodian.130  Each of those 
entities is a subsidiary of a single global financial services company, 
Mellon Financial Corporation.131  In the final analysis, then, the fund 
has retained just one variegated entity to provide it with all the 
apparatus it needs to operate as a mutual fund.132  Or, more accurately, 
one sprawling financial services company has created a mutual fund to 
buy its broad array of professional wares. 
                                                 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692, 56,693 (Oct. 1, 2003). 
 129. As with a typical operating company, mutual funds will also retain the services of 
law firms, accounting firms, and, if need be, public relations firms.  Mutual funds often also 
retain the services of research providers, such as Lipper, to provide performance ratings for 
their funds, as well as pricing services that specialize in fairly valuing stocks for which no 
accurate market quotations are available. 
 130. See Prospectus, Dreyfus Premier Growth and Income Fund, Feb. 1, 2005, at 6-7, 
available at http://www.dreyfus.com/content/dr/control?Content=/docs/mfc/dreyfus-
funds/factsheet.jsp&fundcode=0320# (follow “Prospectus” link) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 131. See id. 
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III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY 
RELATIONSHIP 
A. Applying an Executive Compensation Paradigm 
 To understand how the investment management business works, 
one must understand not only its constituent parts but how those 
components interact.  As has been suggested, no more important 
relationship exists for a mutual fund than that of the fund with its 
investment adviser.133  The adviser provides the experience, expertise, 
strategy, and investment acumen that determines whether a fund 
succeeds or fails, and the adviser’s employees serve as surrogate 
personnel for the fund.  Indeed, the adviser is so integrally entwined 
with the fund and its operations that separating the two is hard to 
conceive and almost impossible, in reality, to do. 
 Yet this intertwined arrangement is also highly unusual in the 
business world.  Typically, a corporation retains its own executives, 
who in turn hire and oversee the remaining layers of management and 
staff needed to carry on the enterprise.134  Of course, operating 
companies routinely engage consultants, contractors, and other third-
party service providers to perform discrete tasks, but only to 
supplement, not to replace utterly, the firm’s employees.  Though these 
differences are notable and render mutual funds a species of their own, 
one can nevertheless turn to a well-studied body of corporate law—
and its attendant exegetic theories—to understand the dynamic 
between a mutual fund and its adviser. 
 The study of executive compensation is the examination of how 
corporations resolve the oldest quandary of corporate law:  the 
principal-agent problem.135  Any business organization owned by one 
constituency but managed by another is susceptible to a divergence in 
the interests of these principals and agents.136  In conventional 
operating companies, this agency problem frequently manifests itself 
in the guise of executives who attempt to maximize their own wealth 
without regard for, or even to the detriment of, the interests of 
shareholders.137  The primary tool used to harmonize the interests of 
these two groups is the employment contract that governs executive 
                                                 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-116. 
 134. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW ¶¶ 6.1-6.3 (1986). 
 135. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933). 
 136. See id. 
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compensation.  On behalf of shareholders, an operating company’s 
board of directors will attempt to negotiate with each executive a 
contract that creates the optimal blend of incentives needed to induce 
the executive to pursue interests of the shareholders without depleting 
any more shareholder value than is absolutely necessary.138 
 The board’s goal in these negotiations is not necessarily to obtain 
the best management money can buy, but the optimal management.  To 
be assured of the very best possible management, a board might have 
to spend far more money than an executive’s service is worth in order 
to obtain a level of expertise that is far more than the enterprise 
requires.  Then, to monitor the executive’s behavior to confirm that it 
aligns with the owners’ interests, a board must expend additional 
resources.  At a certain point, the costs of such management and 
oversight will outweigh the value of any benefits realized by the 
shareholders.  One does not need Jack Welch to run a lemonade stand.  
The goal of executive compensation is to create an optimal agreement 
that best balances the management’s compensation and incentives, the 
shareholders’ interests, and the costs of reaching and policing such an 
agreement.139 
 The same principles operate in the investment advisory context, 
albeit on a different scale.  To retain the services of management, the 
board negotiates not with specific executives but with the investment 
adviser as a single entity.  In effect, the board hires in one transaction 
all the executives that the fund will need to manage its operations.  The 
advisory agreement upon which the board and the adviser agree 
governs the compensation that the adviser will receive in exchange for 
providing management of the fund’s assets.  The adviser, in turn, will 
use that advisory fee to pay the salaries of each of its portfolio 
managers, executives, and other employees.  As with individual 
executive compensation arrangements, the advisory agreement 
contains—with greater and lesser degrees of success—the ingredients 
that will determine whether the adviser’s interests are aligned with 
those of the fund’s shareholders.  The discussion between a mutual 
fund board and the collective personnel of an investment adviser is, in 
essence, just one example of executive compensation negotiations.  
Instead of one executive bargaining with the board, a multitude of 
executives working together in a single business entity are negotiating 
as the collective executive.  Thus, an extension of the theories of 
                                                 
 138. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 753-54. 
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executive compensation into the investment advisory setting is a 
compelling new way to examine the board-adviser dynamic. 
B. The Optimal Contracting Approach 
 Prior to its recent outbreak of infamy, the mutual fund industry 
was considered by many commentators to be a paragon of corporate 
governance.140  Writers such as these pointed to bulwarks that should, 
in theory, protect the interests of shareholders, such as arm’s-length 
bargaining between the board of trustees and the investment adviser, 
robust competition in the mutual fund marketplace, a garrulous 
disclosure regimen that distributes information about funds and their 
management to the public, and highly sophisticated shareholders who 
fully understand the business.141  Many of these same elements are also 
features of a theoretical framework commonly used to study executive 
compensation:  the optimal contracting approach. 
 This approach posits that optimal principal-agent contracts can be 
achieved when the following circumstances are present:  (1) the board 
and the executive conduct their negotiation at arm’s length, (2) market 
forces induce the parties to reach optimal bargains, and 
(3) shareholders can invoke principles of corporate law to reject 
compensation packages that are detrimental to their interests.142  A 
confluence of these three conditions, the theory posits, should produce 
optimal executive compensation contracts.143  To the casual observer of 
the investment advisory industry, these three elements might appear to 
be happily congregated already.  But the infamies of the past two and a 
half years demonstrate the existence of profound flaws in the industry, 
which strongly suggest that the optimal contracting perspective is 
incomplete.  Before examining what the theory lacks, though, let us 
first consider what it contains. 
                                                 
 140. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 4, at 1, 11. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764; see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare:  Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 540, 548-64 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1262-65 (1982); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 959, 973-74 (1980).  The optimal contracting approach posits that optimal 
principal-agent contracts can be achieved when a board focuses on three components:  
(1) securing and maintaining the services of excellent executives, (2) furnishing those 
executives with incentives to expend their energy and to make decisions that redound to the 
benefit of shareholders, and (3) keeping the overall costs of such an engagement as low as 
possible.  See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 762. 
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1. Arm’s-Length Bargaining 
 The optimal contracting approach requires that the two parties 
engaged in the negotiation of a compensatory arrangement be 
independent of one another.144  In addition, the theory posits that, from 
a position of autonomy, a board will conduct negotiations regarding the 
compensation with an eye toward only the maximization of 
shareholder value.145  In the mutual fund context, this approach would 
involve the fund board negotiating with the investment adviser to 
consummate an optimal investment advisory agreement.  The 
investment advisory industry boasts of policies designed to ensure the 
independence of the board in these bargaining sessions. 
 The negotiation of advisory agreements is typically conducted 
between senior representatives of the investment adviser and the 
board’s contracts review committee, comprising members of the board 
charged with reviewing each fund’s principal third-party agreements.  
Federal regulations require that this committee consist only of 
independent trustees of the board; that is, only those trustees who are 
not affiliated with the investment adviser.146  Typically, the chief 
executive officer and other senior executives of the investment adviser 
will (subject to the requirement that a certain percentage of the board 
be independent) serve on a fund’s board of trustees.  These “interested” 
trustees cannot take part in the negotiation of the advisory agreement.  
To approve a contract between the fund and the investment adviser, a 
majority of the independent trustees must vote to do so.147 
 Frequently, the members of the contracts review committee will 
meet by themselves with their own legal counsel in executive session 
to deliberate upon the performance of the investment adviser and the 
funds under the adviser’s management.  This process may take place 
over several months as the trustees review the investment returns of 
each of the funds and meet with representatives from the investment 
adviser to discuss strategic approaches under any renewed contract.  
The trustees will frequently review reports prepared by entities such as 
Lipper, which set forth how the funds’ performance rated when 
compared to other funds of a similar size and with a common 
investment objective.  From these reports, the trustees can determine 
                                                 
 144. Id. at 764. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000). 
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whether the adviser has managed any given fund better or worse than 
the industry average. 
 Assisting the independent trustees in this process may be 
attorneys who represent the funds as well as attorneys who represent 
only the independent trustees.148  And, as is the case in the world of 
operating companies, the decision whether to rehire an investment 
advisor and how much to pay it are matters of judgment, protected by 
the business judgment rule.149  The combination of these elements 
might suggest that the advisory agreement is, indeed, negotiated at 
arm’s length. 
2. Market Forces 
 In addition to the prophylactic benefits of arm’s-length 
negotiation, the optimal contracting approach theory also suggests that 
market forces will compel advisers to seek an optimal, not an 
excessive, level of compensation in their advisory agreements.  The 
competitive landscape of the investment management industry 
certainly appears to contain a multitude of adroit advisers, all eager to 
provide their services to mutual funds and to reap the rewards of 
advisory fees.  This robust marketplace also sustains a related industry 
of entities that specialize in monitoring and rating advisers and their 
funds, such as Lipper150 and Morningstar,151 which in turn propagates a 
great deal of information about the various advisers.  In addition, the 
shareholders of many funds are themselves highly sophisticated 
financial outfits capable of monitoring the reasonableness of the 
investment advisory agreements. 
a. Competition Amongst Investment Advisers 
 In many ways, the investment management industry appears to be 
one of the more robust marketplaces in the U.S. economy.  Hundreds 
of investment advisers manage thousands of mutual funds and vie to 
                                                 
 148. Retaining “independent counsel,” as that term is defined in the rules to the 1940 
Act, is a prerequisite for trustees if they want their funds to be able to rely upon any of a 
series of exemptive rules that are extremely important to the running of an investment 
company.  For Rule 0-1(a)(7)(iii) of the 1940 Act, see 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)-(7)(iii) 
(2005). 
 149. See, e.g., Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d 137, 144 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 150. See Lipper Home Page, http://www.lipperweb.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 






1434 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1401 
 
oversee trillions of dollars.152  On the demand side, almost one hundred 
million Americans participate in this investment emporium.153  One 
could easily assume that the intensity of this competition should bring 
all the invisible genius of Adam Smith to bear on the dynamics of the 
investment advisory agreement.154 
 When it comes to selecting a fund in which to invest, 
shareholders have an almost paralyzing array of choices.  With more 
than 600 mutual fund complexes offering more than 8000 funds, the 
market offers almost every conceivable type of fund to all manner of 
investors.155  Moreover, the market offers many funds of the exact same 
type—for instance, numerous S & P 500 Index mutual funds exist, all 
of which offer the exact same investment (save for any disparities in 
fees charged by the adviser).156  Surely, then, advisers should be acutely 
sensitive to the competition they face.  The first step they must take to 
harvest any revenues is to negotiate successfully with the board of a 
fund over an advisory agreement.  Should the adviser demand too high 
an advisory fee, it may be unsuccessful in persuading the board to 
agree, and without the advisory agreement, the adviser receives 
nothing. 
 After the initial execution of an advisory agreement, the market 
would appear to compel the adviser to continue performing to the best 
of its ability.  Advisory agreements generally last for only one year at a 
time,157 so advisors work on a short leash and therefore a board may, if 
it chooses, quickly terminate an adviser for doing a poor job. 
 Many advisers develop mutual fund complexes in which they 
advise multiple funds.158  The marginal costs of creating and advising a 
new fund are low once the adviser has already established its portfolio 
management and distribution operations.  Managing more funds 
allows advisers to attract more shareholders interested in a broader 
array of financial products.  Thus, the adviser must continue to offer 
                                                 
 152. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 70-78. 
 153. See id. at 79. 
 154. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 225 (Random House 1985) (1776). 
 155. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 13. 
 156. See, e.g., The Motley Fool, No-Load Index Funds, http://www.fool.com/ 
mutualfunds/indexfunds/table01.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (listing 17 no-load S & P 
500 index funds). 
 157. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) 
(2000). 
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low advisory fees coupled with high performance in order to induce 
the board of trustees to approve the launch of new funds by the adviser. 
 Even more than in the case of compensation for operating 
company executives, the costs of hiring an adviser are passed directly 
on to the end customers.  When they shop for mutual fund shares, 
potential investors can read tables included in fund prospectuses that 
set forth data describing the fees they will pay.159  Thus, when 
negotiating an advisory contract, advisers must offer an advisory fee 
that is acceptable not only to the board but also to potential 
shareholders.  If an adviser demands too high an advisory fee in 
negotiations with the board, then even if it were to persuade the board 
to accede to the fee, the marketplace might still reject the fund.  
Shareholders might simply not purchase the shares, and the fund 
would struggle to accumulate assets to be managed.  Thus, perhaps to 
an even greater extent than the compensation of individual executives, 
advisory fees appear to be determined by what the market will bear. 
 In addition, the consequences of dismissal by a board’s 
termination of an advisory agreement would be profound for an 
adviser.  Not only would the adviser immediately lose all revenues 
from the assets of the fund in question, but the decision would send a 
dramatic signal to the market, warning shareholders in other funds of 
serious problems with the investment adviser.  Moreover, in the context 
of a complex of mutual funds, if a board were sufficiently dissatisfied 
with an adviser to evict it from one fund, it might easily do so for any 
of the other funds in the complex.  Thus, the market would appear not 
only to compel an adviser to propose a reasonable advisory fee when 
seeking a contract but, when operating under that contract, to perform 
to its utmost. 
b. Dissemination of Information 
 As the supply and demand for mutual funds has grown, so too 
has the concomitant market for information about those funds.  As part 
of their marketing efforts, many funds announce the performance of 
their funds in advertisements directed to the investing public.  
                                                 
 159. The registration statement under the 1940 Act for open-end mutual funds, set 
forth on Form N-1A, requires that investment companies include information relating to a 
description of the fund and its investments and risks (in Item 11 of Form N-1A); the 
management of the fund (Item 12); the portfolio managers (Item 15); purchase, redemption, 
and pricing of shares (Item 18); taxation of the fund (Item 19); underwriters (Item 20); the 
calculation of performance data (Item 21); financial statements (Item 22); and a variety of 
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Individual investors can themselves readily find detailed research on 
funds through their broker/dealers or from entities that specialize 
entirely in gathering and reporting information on funds, such as 
Lipper and Morningstar.160  Boards of trustees, also, can and often do 
commission detailed reports on the performance of the funds under 
their care as part of the process of deciding whether to renew advisory 
agreements.161 
 During the lengthy contract renewal process, trustees often focus 
on how well the investment adviser—and the funds the adviser is 
managing—are performing.  Frequently, the adviser itself will produce 
reports setting forth this information.162  Trustees, however, can also 
solicit more independent, third-party research customized to their fund 
complex.  A report by Lipper, for instance, might set forth such 
information as the total assets of each fund as of a certain date; the 
total one-year, three-year, five-year, and ten-year returns for the fund; 
and the expenses being charged by the adviser and the distributor as a 
percentage of the fund’s average net assets.  Perhaps more importantly, 
these reports also provide comparisons to competitors, setting forth the 
quintile or decile in which the performance or fees rank as compared 
to all funds that use a similar investment approach.  From these 
reports, trustees can determine whether an adviser is performing better 
or worse—and how much so—than the industry average.  Similarly, 
the reports will inform the board whether the shareholders whom it 
represents are being charged fees in line with industry norms.163 
 Moreover, to the extent that inherent market forces do not 
produce information enough for shareholders and trustees, federal 
regulations do.  One of the constant tasks that every investment adviser 
faces is satisfying the enormous disclosure requirements of the 1940 
Act and the Advisers Act.164  For the benefit of current and future 
shareholders, each fund that an adviser manages must maintain a 
prospectus that sets forth a great deal of fund data and a Statement of 
                                                 
 160. See Lipper Home Page, supra note 150; Morningstar Home Page, supra note 151. 
 161. See, e.g., Beagan Wilcox, How Boards Ensure They’re Still Focused on 
Performance, BOARDIQ, May 17, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/home/members/article_ 
search_results.html?id=974211885 (subscription required). 
 162. See id. 
 163. For example, Lipper provides a suite of advisory contract renewal services geared 
towards allowing fund trustees to satisfy their requirements under Section 15(c) of the 1940 
Act.  See Lipper Fund Fact Sheets, Advisory Contract Renewal Services-15(c), http://www. 
lipperweb.com/products/contract_renewal.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 164. See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing just some of the 
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Additional Information (SAI) that sets forth an avalanche.165  In these 
documents, as well as in annual reports, semiannual reports, certified 
shareholder reports, and several other regularly required disclosure 
documents, advisers must, in extensive detail, lay bare the fees,166 
performance histories,167 investment strategies,168 and risks of the funds 
they manage.169  A mutual fund will regularly file several hundreds of 
pages with the SEC each year.170  For the purposes of negotiating an 
advisory agreement, then, mutual fund boards have no reason not to 
consult all the data they need to make a fully informed negotiation. 
c. Protection from Sophisticated Shareholders 
 Despite the deep and widespread ownership of mutual fund 
shares by the American public,171 by no means are all investors simply 
future retirees.  Many fund shareholders are sophisticated and 
financially influential entities, with millions and even billions of 
dollars at their disposal to invest.172  Government pension plans, 
university endowments, and even other mutual funds regularly 
purchase shares in investment companies.173  With them, they bring a 
professional staff of highly knowledgeable financial experts, adroit at 
determining whether an advisory contract for a particular fund is or is 
not well calibrated to advance their interests.  Their decision not to 
purchase shares in a fund or to leave it in response to an ill-conceived 
                                                 
 165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing disclosure requirements 
set forth in Form N-1A); see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Information Available to 
Investment Company Shareholders, Statement of Additional Information, http://www.sec. 
gov/answers/mfinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (describing disclosure requirements of 
the SA1). 
 166. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Registration Statement (Form N-1A), http://www. 
sec.gov/about/forms/formn_1a.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. For a sense of the filing requirements, visit EDGAR Company Search, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (enter 
the name of any mutual fund registrant). 
 171. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 79-83. 
 172. The identities of these large shareholders are set forth in the public filings of 
mutual funds.  Item 13 of Form N-1A requires that mutual funds disclose principal holders of 
their securities, so each fund’s SAI will include a list of major shareholders, many of which 
are institutional investors.  See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Registration Statement (Form N-
1A), Item 13, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn_1a.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).  
Item 13(b) states:  “State the name, address, and percentage of ownership of each person who 
owns of record or is known by the Fund to own beneficially 5% or more of any Class of the 
Fund’s outstanding equity securities.”  Id. 
 173. In the investment management industry, these funds of funds are frequently called 
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advisory agreement would serve as a signal to more passive investors 
of the lack of an optimal arrangement.  The presence of these erudite 
watchdogs adds yet another protective market force that should drive 
the terms of an advisory contract toward an optimal equilibrium. 
3. Corporate Law Remedies 
 A third component that works to produce optimal contracts, 
according to proponents of the hypothesis, is the body of corporate law 
that allows shareholders to pursue judicial means to challenge advisory 
contracts that they believe are less than optimal.174  Specifically, 
shareholders have the option of bringing a lawsuit—most likely a 
derivative action—to challenge an advisory agreement that they 
believe pays the investment adviser too much.175  Such an action might 
allege that the board has committed waste or breached its duties of 
loyalty or care.  If successful, this avenue of recourse would 
necessarily impose a substantial influence on the development of 
optimal contracts, not only by bringing to bear the force of judicial fiat 
on the advisory fees but also by creating an environment in which 
boards and investment advisers must bargain in the shadow of such 
direct legal remedies. 
 At a superficial glance, the criteria proposed by the optimal 
contracting theory might appear to suggest that the investment 
advisory business is a healthy one—and, indeed, commentators only 
recently argued that the industry’s governance was “a model for 
corporate America.”176  But the even more recent proliferation of 
widespread malfeasance is a strong hint that all is not optimal.  The 
inquiry, then, must turn to the shortcomings of the optimal contracting 
theory and to possible alternatives. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 In rejecting the optimal contracting approach, a trio of 
commentators has protested that managers wield so much influence 
over their own pay arrangements that the theory’s three requisite 
                                                 
 174. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 779-80 (discussing the efficacy 
of derivative litigation). 
 175. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive 
Pay:  An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 573-80 (2001). 
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conditions rarely, if ever, coexist.177  Moreover, any analysis of 
executive compensation that fails to appreciate the true extent of 
managerial power is necessarily incomplete.  In advancing this 
managerial power hypothesis, Lucian Bebchuck, Jesse Fried, and 
David Walker begin by pointing out the limitations in fact upon arm’s-
length negotiations, market forces, and legal redress.178  Although their 
analysis focuses on operating companies, similar limitations also 
plague the interactions of boards and advisers in the mutual fund 
context. 
A. Limitations of the Optimal Contracting Approach 
 The same three components of the optimal contract approach that 
apparently function so well are actually afflicted by serious limitations, 
some of which are unique to the investment advisory context and some 
of which maintain in the operating company setting as well. 
1. Arm’s-Length Bargaining 
 To enjoy any distance from the investment adviser, whether it is 
an inch or the length of an arm, a board must truly have an 
independent character.  In the days when every member of the board 
worked for (or had some other direct affiliation with) the adviser, any 
negotiation between the two was far more cozy than businesslike.  
Even today, when many boards contain large majorities of technically 
independent trustees, one might wonder at the extent to which such 
legislated independence actually equates with a real freedom to 
disavow completely the wishes of the investment adviser. 
 As has been discussed, only the independent trustees of a board 
may participate in the decision to enter into or to renew an advisory 
agreement, and a majority of those independent trustees is required to 
do so.179  “Independence” in this context is purely a legal determination 
that the trustee is not an “interested person” of the mutual fund, as that 
term is defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 Act.180  The Act 
generally deems interested any person who is an officer or employee 
of the fund or its investment adviser,181 or a close family member 
                                                 
 177. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61-79 (2004); Bebchuk, supra note 46, 
at 843-49; Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 751. 
 178. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764-83. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000). 
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thereof,182 a lawyer of the fund or its investment adviser,183 or anyone 
who has had a significant professional or business relationship with 
the fund complex or its investment adviser during the past two and a 
half years.184 
 Of course, this definition fails to deem a grandparent or 
grandchild of the investment adviser’s chief executive officer an 
interested person; nor would it exclude that CEO’s partner, best friend, 
or golfing buddy.185  A wide array of intimate and yet nominally 
independent relationships may exist within the regulations.  Even the 
SEC “recognize[s] that ‘legal’ independence does not equate with 
‘real’ independence.”186  Furthermore, although many trustees may join 
the board through the efforts of a nomination committee, which itself 
is comprised of only independent trustees, the adviser always 
participates to some extent in the process.  When a fund is first formed, 
it is the adviser—as the sole shareholder—who determines who will 
be the trustees.  Thus, even technically independent trustees are likely 
to be known personally to the members of the adviser who have 
nominated them, and every subsequent trustee, whether independent 
or not, will descend from this initial relationship.  Thus, the potential 
for nominees to have a personal and preexisting relationship with the 
senior management of the adviser is extremely high.  Moreover, even if 
such a relationship does not exist at the outset of a board member’s 
service, collegiality is very likely to develop over the course of service 
on any board that meets many times a year.187 
 Aside from personal connections to the adviser, one must 
consider where the independent trustees’ pecuniary interests lie.  While 
they may, like shareholders, own shares in the funds they oversee, 
nothing obliges them to do so.  From time to time, shareholders 
propose schemes whereby trustees must purchase shares in the funds 
they oversee, but shareholder meetings for mutual funds are extremely 
                                                 
 182. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). 
 183. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iv), (B)(iv). 
 184. Id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vi), (B)(vi). 
 185. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19). 
 186. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 187. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 31-34 (“Whether or not a particular 
director was appointed during the CEO’s reign, that director is likely to develop a personal 






2006] THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 1441 
 
rare, and such proposals are typically only precatory.188  On the other 
hand, independent trustees receive regular paychecks for their services 
to the funds and, on balance, the larger the number of funds and assets 
they oversee, the larger their remuneration.189 
 Fund complexes typically compensate their independent trustees 
through either a top-down or bottom-up approach.  In a top-down 
system, the board fixes a compensation figure for its members, the 
cost of which is then borne by all the funds in the complex on a pro 
rata basis according to the amount of assets in each fund.  A bottom-up 
approach involves determining a figure to be paid by each unit of 
assets, which are then added up by all the funds in the complex to 
arrive at a final sum.  If the assets of the complex grow, then this latter 
system automatically increases the trustees’ compensation.190  In a top-
down approach, trustees may feel more at liberty to increase their own 
remuneration when they know that a greater number of shareholders 
will bear any added costs.  In either system, the trustees’ financial 
incentives are linked to the adviser’s with respect to increasing the 
assets under management—both trustees and advisers will, on balance, 
be paid more when a fund complex has more assets under 
management.191  Of course, in order for any assets to be under 
management, the trustees must approve an advisory agreement.  So, in 
order to receive payment for their services, trustees have an incentive 
to work with the investment adviser to consummate an agreement. 
 In addition to these interpersonal and fiscal considerations, board 
dynamics also limit the degree to which independent trustees and the 
investment adviser interact at a meaningful distance.192  For the typical 
                                                 
 188. See Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a 
Greater Say over Executive Pay?:  Learning from the U.S. Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 
277, 286-94 (2001). 
 189. INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS 21 
(1999). 
 190. See Bonnie Bauman, Fidelity Directors Got “Huge” Pay Raises Last Year, 
BOARDIQ, Feb. 8, 2005, at 1, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print/20050208/fidelity_ 
directors_huge_raises_last_year (subscription required). 
 191. Interestingly, trustees also receive more compensation when they are forced to 
meet more frequently to address pressing issues; such as, for instance, during the heightened 
investigative and regulatory climate of the past two and a half years.  See Bauman, supra note 
101 (“Director pay climbed 13% in 2004, according to a study just released by Management 
Practice, a fund governance consulting firm.  For the second year in a row, the hike was more 
attributable to an increase in the number of board meetings than an increase in board 
retainers.”). 
 192. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 23-44 (“[S]ignificant deviations from 
arm’s-length contracting have been common in widely held public companies.”); Bebchuk, 





1442 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1401 
 
board meeting, employees of the adviser are charged with preparing 
and distributing materials in advance; portfolio managers and other 
executives of the adviser make technical presentations; and, until quite 
recently, the chair of the board would almost certainly have been a 
high-ranking executive of the adviser.  Thus, the adviser, through one 
means or another, has a great deal of influence over the content and 
tenor of board meetings.  More importantly, the adviser, regardless of 
whether one of its employees officially chairs the board, controls 
access to data about the inner workings of the fund and the adviser.  
This combination of personal relationships among the interested and 
independent trustees, common financial incentives, and the adviser’s 
domination of the board proceedings will inevitably reduce the degree 
to which any negotiations over the advisory agreement can truly 
operate at arm’s length. 
2. Market Forces 
 The degree to which the market resolutely guides the board and 
the adviser to an optimal pay arrangement also should not be 
overstated.  Several factors interfere with the theoretically orthodox 
conception of a marketplace carefully protected by the beneficent 
forces of competition, information, and the wiser shareholders 
amongst us. 
a. Competition Amongst Investment Advisers 
 Although there are, indeed, hundreds of advisers and thousands 
of funds from which a shareholder may choose, the managerial labor 
market for any particular fund is far from fluid.  While, ab initio, an 
investor newly arrived to the mutual fund forum can choose only those 
funds with the best performance and lowest advisory fees, many 
investors are not arriving to the agora unfettered.  Many are brought by 
their 401(k) plans to a small corner of the emporium and offered only 
a limited menu of mutual funds.193  Many others are already 
shareholders in mutual funds.  Like individual shareholders, each 
fund’s board of trustees must also decide on an investment adviser.  For 
the board, however, the choice relating to investment advisers is not a 
wide open selection among the economy’s finest performers; it is, 
instead, simply a binary:  to renew or not to renew the advisory 
agreement with the fund’s current adviser.194 
                                                 
 193. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 45-49. 
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 While it is theoretically possible for a fund board to decline to 
renew an advisory agreement with the fund’s adviser, in practice, such 
a termination practically never happens.  Changing a fund’s adviser 
would, in effect, be to change the very nature of the fund.  Suppose a 
board were, for example, to fire MFS as the investment adviser of a 
global equity fund and to hire, as a replacement, Putnam.  One could 
reasonably assume that if Putnam were an expert in global equities, it 
would already advise a global equity fund in its own complex.  Thus, 
to the extent that shareholders of the MFS global equity fund are 
unhappy with the investment adviser, they do not need to wait for the 
board to provide a remedy; rather, they have a ready solution of their 
own at hand:  they can simply redeem their MFS shares, exit the fund, 
and purchase shares of the Putnam fund.  To the extent that 
shareholders have not made such a switch, the board might assume 
that the shareholders are indicating their satisfaction with MFS as the 
adviser of the fund.  Moreover, because many shareholders invest in a 
particular fund to obtain the investment management services of a 
specific investment adviser, a board’s decision to change adviser 
effectively negates the shareholders’ preference. 
 Consequently, the termination of advisory agreements is so rare 
as to be practically an impossibility.  This limitation severely restricts 
the ability of a fund’s board to control the management of the fund, a 
fact of which investment advisers are acutely aware.  Indeed, even 
following the unprecedented wave of problems that has deluged the 
industry, not one board of trustees has pointed to these developments 
and declined to renew an advisory agreement with any investment 
adviser.195 
 Of course, not every investor who refuses to exit a mutual fund is 
voicing support for the adviser or its fees.  Inertia and ignorance are 
potent supporters of the status quo.  Some investors may believe that 
the board of trustees will protect them from what they believe are truly 
excessive fees.  In this respect, both the trustees and the shareholders 
may be looking to the other party to object to high advisory fees.  In 
addition, an adviser’s fees may not be so high as to drive away 
shareholders and yet still be higher than is optimal.  The paradox of an 
apparently transparent compensation scheme in which both trustees 
                                                 
 195. See Diana B. Henriques, A Sense of History, A Feeling of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 2, 2004, at C1 (quoting former industry leader, Michael F. Price:  “You know what the 
shocking thing to me is?  That nobody has had a contract canceled by a board of directors.  
Even where a chairman was messing around with the fund, the board didn't cancel the 
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and shareholders are familiar with the advisory fees is that neither 
group may feel the need to be the ultimate monitor. 
b. Dissemination of Information 
 Yet if shareholders do have access to advisory fees, perhaps they 
ultimately retain the ability to protect themselves by shunning advisers 
with high fees.  Alas, this option is handicapped by two added 
complications that both create a dearth of transparency regarding 
advisers’ compensation.  First, the amount of information for any given 
mutual fund is not just extensive, it is practically overwhelming.196  
Second, the true compensation to the adviser is not captured in one 
simple number but through a complex agglomeration of multiple 
variables.197  So, although most mutual funds do not lock in 
shareholder capital and, on the contrary, allow shareholders to redeem 
shares easily, the decision to redeem is useless without the knowledge 
of when to do so.198 
 The prospectus and SAI for any given fund in a major complex 
can run to well over a hundred pages.199  As any experienced litigator 
knows, if one must produce adverse facts, it is often best to do so 
amidst an avalanche of documents.  When advisers disclose their 
advisory fees, they may provide information for each different class of 
shares that a particular fund offers and include provisos for redemption 
fees,200 exchange fees,201 account fees,202 temporary fee waivers,203 
                                                 
 196. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements of 
Form N-1A). 
 197. In fact, one major mutual fund complex—the UMB Scout family of funds—is 
now considering a plan to unbundle its fees, so that the board will be able to assess and to 
control specific expenses.  See Bonnie Bauman, UMB Scout Funds Revamp Fee Structure, 
BOARDIQ, Feb. 8, 2005, http://www.boardiq.com/articles/print20050503/more_time_more_ 
money_directors (subscription required). 
 198.  See Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean, and Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: 
The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows (December 2003), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=496315 (documenting, inter alia, no relation between fund flows and 
operating expenses charged by brokerage firms). 
 199. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 80 and source cited therein.  The ICI defines a 
redemption fee as a fee “paid to a fund to cover the costs, other than sales costs, involved with 
a redemption.”  INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 20. 
 201. “This [exchange] fee may be charged when an investor transfers money from one 
fund to another within the same fund family.”  Id. 
 202. Account fees “may be charged by some funds, for example, to cover the costs of 
providing services to low-balance accounts.”  Id.  When an investor’s holdings in a fund drop 
to a sufficiently low level, the account fee is designed to prevent the transfer agent from 
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distribution fees,204 and other idiosyncratic expenses.  If one asked a 
portfolio manager what the cost is to invest in his or her mutual fund, 
the answer is almost sure to be, “It depends.”  Class A shares include 
front-end sales charges (or loads), class B shares include contingent 
deferred sales charges or back-end loads which vary with the amount 
of time the shares are held, and some class C shares include neither 
front- nor back-end loads but feature higher fees across the life of the 
investment.205  In addition, the purchase of a certain threshold of shares 
might entitle the investor to lower fees on the marginal amounts above 
certain price breakpoints.  For the average shareholder, then, 
determining the precise cost to invest in any given mutual fund rivals 
the complexity of calculating the exact cost of a home mortgage with 
its innumerable fees and closing costs.  The fund’s advisory fee and the 
mortgage’s interest rate are prominent and important guideposts, but 
they hardly tell the whole story. 
 These computations are also complicated for the board, which 
must conclude whether to approve of the fees.  As with the 
compensation of an operating company’s CEO—which might 
comprise a complicated equation of signing bonuses, deferred 
compensation, pension benefits, and stock options—the compensation 
of an investment adviser is a similarly convoluted function of several 
variables.206  For the trustees of a board that oversees dozens, scores, or 
even hundreds of mutual funds, the ability to sort through this 
information—even if provided in convenient reports by Lipper207—is 
                                                                                                             
 203. In some recent settlement agreements, investment advisers have agreed to lower 
the fees they charge investors, though typically only for a finite number of years.  See, e.g., 
Riva D. Atlas, Janus Agrees to Lower Fees in $225 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2004, at C5 (“The Janus Capital Group said yesterday that it would lower fees on its mutual 
funds as part of a $225 million settlement with regulators over improper trading in its funds.  
The New York attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, demanded the fee reduction of $125 million 
over five years . . . .”); see also Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer, 
Salazar Announce Market-Timing Settlement with Janus Capital Management, LLC (Apr. 
27, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/apr/apr27a_04.html (agreeing to 
pay a $125 million in fee reductions over a five-year period). 
 204. The distribution (12b-1) fee, “if charged, is deducted from fund assets to 
compensate sales professionals for providing services to mutual fund shareholders in 
connection with the purchase and sale of shares or the maintenance of accounts, and to pay 
fund marketing and advertising expenses.”  INV. CO. INST., supra note 3, at 21. 
 205. See Rochelle Kauffman Plesset & Diane E. Ambler, The Financing of Mutual 
Fund “B Share” Arrangements, 52 BUS. LAW. 1385, 1385 & n.1 (1997). 
 206. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 775-78 (“The typical CEO’s 
compensation package is composed of a base salary, an annual bonus, stock options and/or 
restricted shares, and often other long-term incentive elements.”). 
 207.  Some critics contend that even intermediaries who are expert in compiling and 
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constrained by the time and expertise that the trustees bring to their 
positions which are, after all, only part-time. 
c. Protection from Sophisticated Shareholders 
 If average shareholders cannot count on boards to guarantee their 
financial well being and are unable to parse the fee disclosure for 
themselves, perhaps they can at least rely upon their more savvy fellow 
investors to serve as sentinels and to police the system for them.  With 
pension plans, university endowments, and other mutual funds 
investing in funds, surely their full-time staffs of financial 
professionals wield sufficient clout and expertise to determine 
precisely whether any given investment adviser has exceeded the 
optimal level of fees.  And surely these institutional investors will then 
use their influence to bring back into line any high fees to arrive at an 
optimal level of compensation for the adviser and the shareholders.  
More importantly, investment advisers should be sufficiently afraid of 
driving away the considerable business of institutional investors to 
avoid setting fees so high as to lose their custom. 
 Indeed, these institutional investors bring their influence to bear 
on the pricing system for mutual fund shares.  But rather than cross-
subsidizing the less sophisticated mutual fund investors amidst them, 
they do what any healthy person would, if able, when surrounded by an 
ailing population:  they exit the pool altogether.  Institutional investors 
invest in mutual funds through their own class of shares, which come 
with a customized pricing system far more advantageous to the 
investors than the typical retail share.  Subject to a steep minimum 
investment, these institutional shares offer far lower advisory and other 
fees to the funds’ most valuable investors.208  Thus, the presence of 
investing experts in their midst does little to guarantee average 
investors an optimal pricing system.209 
                                                                                                             
shareholders.  See, e.g., David F. Swensen, Unconventional Success: A Fundamental 
Approach to Personal Investment 178-181 (2005) (“The highly touted Morningstar rating 
system reinforces the investing public’s unfortunate tendency to focus on past performance.  
Purely statistical, backward-looking calculations provide no help in identifying superior 
managers.). 
 208. Institutional investors may be required, for instance, to purchase a minimum 
investment of $1 million, in exchange for which their assets will be subject to an advisory fee 
many basis points lower than that of the ordinary, retail investor. 
 209. Indeed, some regulators, such as the office of the New York Attorney General, 
have entered settlement agreements pursuant to which fund boards must consider the pricing 
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3. Corporate Law Remedies 
 The limitations of lawsuits are well known to potential plaintiffs, 
regardless of whether their complaints originate from the excesses of 
operating company executives or investment advisers.  Even under the 
best of circumstances, such derivative suits are extremely difficult to 
win, given the demand and futility requirements, the protection 
afforded trustees by the business judgment rule, the ability of a board 
to protect itself with a special litigation committee, and all the other 
impediments to success at both trial and appeal.210 
 While an operating company may offer an investment 
opportunity that truly is sui generis, the majority of mutual funds are 
not very difficult to replicate with competitors’ offerings.211  Therefore, 
while many fund shareholders may proceed unaware of shortcomings 
of their advisory fees, if such a shareholder were to grow sufficiently 
agitated to consider bringing an action to produce a judicially decreed 
optimal advisory fee, surely a far simpler alternative would exist well 
before trial:  the shareholder could simply redeem his or her shares and 
reinvest them in a more amenably priced competitor. 
 Corporate law is, of course, not entirely impotent with respect to 
bringing redress to wronged shareholders.  Indeed, if the events of the 
past two and a half years have demonstrated anything, it is the power 
of regulatory action to identify and ameliorate industry excesses.  Prior 
to this full-scale regulatory assault on investment advisers, however, 
shareholders either did not know how to, or did not care to, initiate 
private litigation in any concerted way.212  Thus, the courts by 
themselves did little to guide boards and advisers toward optimal 
investment advisory agreements. 
                                                 
 210. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 779-82 (“[C]orporate law permits 
shareholders to challenge a particular compensation package under a variety of doctrines.  
However, the obstacles to the success of such a lawsuit all but ensure that courts never review 
the substantive merits of management compensation arrangements.”). 
 211. See, e.g., The Motley Fool, No-Load Index Funds, http://www.fool. 
com/mutualfunds/indexfunds/table01.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (listing 17 no-load 
S & P 500 index funds). 
 212.  When such suits have been brought in the past, however, a landmark decision has 
established a standard that has, to date, been insurmountable.  See Gartenberg v. Merrill 
Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982) (“To be guilty of a violation of § 36(b), 
therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it 
bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product 
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B. The Managerial Power Hypothesis 
 The optimal contracting approach suggests that, when present, 
arm’s-length negotiation, market forces, and corporate law will impel 
boards and managers to negotiate compensation schemes that 
optimally align the interests of shareholders and managers.213  
Arguably, the current investment advisory industry does not satisfy 
those three criteria and perhaps, therefore, the absence of optimal 
contracts in the industry is not surprising.  Of course, in the storm of 
recent upheavals, no one has proved that the advisory agreements 
between mutual funds and their advisers are less than optimal.  Instead, 
the allegations have focused on a host of other activities by the 
advisers to the detriment of the funds and, by extension, their 
shareholders.  The optimal contracting approach provides no guidance 
as to how or why such behavior may have occurred.  The managerial 
power hypothesis, on the other hand, does. 
 The managerial power hypothesis, like the optimal contracting 
approach, begins with an acknowledgement of the “agency problem 
inherent in the manager-shareholder relationship.”214  Unlike the 
optimal contracting approach, however, the managerial power 
hypothesis sees executive compensation not as the remedy to the 
agency problem but as “part of the problem itself.”215  Many of the 
limitations of the optimal contracting approach arise from the fact that 
managers possess power sufficient to pervert the course of arm’s-
length bargaining.  The managerial power hypothesis predicts that, in 
such situations, managers will use their power to extract rents, in the 
form of “compensation more favorable than they would get under 
arm’s-length bargaining.”216  Extending this perspective to the 
investment management context, one might expect investment advisers 
with sufficient power vis-à-vis the board of trustees to exact rents from 
the funds that they manage. 
 Indeed, as we have already seen, many investment advisers do 
possess a great deal of power in interactions with boards of trustees.  
By virtue of running all aspects of a mutual fund every day, the senior 
executives of an adviser are far more familiar with the operations, 
trading strategies, investment success, and regulatory compliance of 
that fund than the members of the board, who meet to discuss the fund 
                                                 
 213. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 764. 
 214. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 61. 
 215. Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 784. 
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only on a part-time basis.  Moreover, what the board discusses at those 
occasional meetings is subject, in large part, to the agenda, reports, and 
presentations provided to the board by the employees of the adviser.  If 
a board has suspicions of malfeasance, it can certainly consult its 
separate legal counsel, but the board can hardly subject the adviser to a 
constant audit of its operations. 
 In its original incarnation, the managerial power hypothesis 
suggested that the CEO or other individual officers of an operating 
company might have power ascendant over the company’s board to 
extract rents.217  When one aggregates the influence of the entire 
management and personnel of a mutual fund into the single investment 
adviser entity, there can be little doubt that the collective unit has the 
upper hand with the fund’s board of trustees.  Not only is the manager 
in the mutual fund context—that is, the investment adviser—more 
powerful than the prototypical CEO, but the board of trustees is weaker 
than the typical operating company’s board of directors.  While firing a 
CEO is not an easy matter, doing so is far more straightforward than 
terminating an advisory contract, which, as I have discussed, is 
tantamount to terminating the going enterprise of the mutual fund.218  
While relatively rare, CEO terminations are eminently more common 
than terminations of advisory contracts.219 
 Furthermore, mutual fund boards are also incapable of wielding 
direct authority over employees of the investment adviser.  While the 
board of an operating company can choose to discipline any employee 
in the company, a mutual fund board has no such authority.  The 
individuals who work with a mutual fund are employees not of the 
fund but of the investment adviser and, as such, do not report to the 
board of trustees but to the board of directors of the adviser.  So 
although a fund board can express a pointed opinion to the investment 
adviser and exert indirect pressure, it cannot directly retain, promote, 
or terminate an employee of the adviser.  The mutual fund board is 
thus deprived of a line-item veto; if it feels deeply enough to wish the 
dismissal of an individual, it must threaten the termination of the entire 
advisory relationship.  In sum, the board of trustees of a mutual fund 
                                                 
 217. See id. at 784-86. 
 218. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
 219. In fact, recently, the termination of a chief executive officer has become 
somewhat common.  See, e.g., Steve Bailey, A Matter of Governance, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
18, 2005, at E1 (“Corporate boards are suddenly showing the backbone their many critics 
have been demanding for years.  And big-name CEOs are falling like dominoes.”); Pui-Wing 
Tam, Fallen Star:  H-P’s Board Ousts Fiorina as CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at A1 
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possesses many of the same responsibilities to its shareholders as does 
the board of an operating company but without anywhere near the 
same array of tools. 
 Aside from terminating the investment advisory contract, a board 
of trustees has perhaps only one instrument of consequence:  public 
complaint.  If a board is convinced that an adviser is behaving badly or 
failing to cooperate, the board can threaten to voice its concern to the 
SEC or otherwise make its displeasure known publicly.  Particularly in 
today’s environment of heightened regulatory scrutiny, such a threat is 
likely to grab the adviser’s attention and may restore some balance of 
power with the adviser.  Similarly, the board can address its concerns 
to the shareholders of a fund, many of whom are also sensitive to the 
lingering whiff of impropriety abroad in the industry.  At a time when 
investors have only recently withdrawn billions of dollars from funds 
tainted by regulatory investigations,220 an adviser might well be 
concerned that shareholders offered any reason for concern by their 
trustees would be quick to abandon a fund.  Of course, like all 
shepherds, boards can threaten such outcries only a few times before 
they lose their potency.221 
 Notwithstanding its criticism of the optimal contracting 
hypothesis, the managerial power perspective “does not imply that 
there are no constraints at all on compensation and the rents that 
[managers] can capture.”222  On the contrary, the hypothesis is acutely 
aware of the outrage that compensation arrangements particularly 
favorable to managers might spark. 
If an executive’s compensation arrangement goes far beyond what could 
be justified under optimal contracting and is perceived that way by 
outsiders, those outsiders might become angry and upset.  If this 
outrage is sufficiently widespread and intense, it limits the extent to 
which compensation can be increased in a number of ways.223 
Investment advisers are similarly sensitive to public censure of their 
compensation, which could easily prompt substantial redemptions 
from their mutual fund, which would reduce the assets under their 
management and, in turn, the fees they receive from advising those 
                                                 
 220. See Joe Morris, More Big Players Hit with Outflows, IGNITES, June 25, 2004, 
http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040625/more_players_with_outflows (“[In May 
2004,] Fidelity had the worst showing of the group, with an estimated $2 billion in 
net withdrawals.  It had taken in a net $2.5 billion in April.”). 
 221. See AESOP, AESOP’S FABLES 78 (Laura Gibbs trans., 2002). 
 222. Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 46, at 786. 
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funds.  In many ways, this theory is almost more suited to the 
investment advisory context than to operating companies, since 
advisory fees are such a critical ingredient in the decision to invest in a 
mutual fund.  While it is true that an investor might be willing to 
ignore high advisory fees if a fund is garnering lucrative returns, as a 
general matter, those fees will have a stronger bearing on an investor’s 
decision to buy mutual fund shares than the compensation of an 
operating company’s chief executive will influence an investor’s 
decision to buy that company’s shares. 
 To minimize outrage and its attendant deleterious effects, a 
manager will, according to the managerial power approach, seek to 
reduce the degree to which his or her hunger for compensation is 
perceived by outsiders.  “Because perceptions are so important, the 
designers of compensation plans can limit outside criticism and 
outrage by dressing, packaging, or hiding—in short, camouflaging—
rent extraction.”224  This camouflage typically takes the form of 
perquisites, stock options, benefits, and other forms of remuneration to 
the executive that are either less easy to comprehend than a simple 
salary or are more capable of being disguised.  In applying this theory 
to the investment management context, one might equate advisory fees 
to an executive’s salary.  To what, then, would one compare these 
disguised perks, options, and benefits?  Possibly to the morass of 
additional fees and expenses buried in funds’ prospectuses.  But if 
investment advisers are more powerful than executives, and mutual 
fund boards of trustees are weaker than operating company boards of 
directors, one might expect the managerial power hypothesis to apply 
with even greater force in the investment advisory context.  With that 
premise in mind, perhaps the accretion of disguised benefits is more 
widespread in the mutual fund context.  And perhaps the litany of 
problems that have recently beset the industry are best thought of as 
investment advisers’ disguised attempts to accrue additional rents. 
V. CAMOUFLAGED EXTRACTIONS OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 Investment advisers are commonly ranked by the amounts of 
assets they manage.225  Because their own wealth is such a direct 
function of those assets under management, the metric is also an easy 
                                                 
 224. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 177, at 67. 
 225. See, e.g., Lipper Home Page, supra note 150.  Note that new SEC rules restrict 
the degree to which investment advisers may advertise by touting the past performance of the 
funds they manage.  See Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, Investment 
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proxy for the advisers’ success.  For every new dollar of assets in one 
of its funds, an adviser will realize perhaps a penny or two or maybe 
even something less in advisory fees.  But when those assets grow to a 
flood of billions of dollars, advisers’ profits soon become real money.  
Of course, amounts like these do not come free from potential 
conflicts of interest.  Advisers constantly face situations in which they 
must choose between their own pecuniary advancement and their 
shareholders’ best interests.  A dynamic shared by many of the mutual 
fund irregularities of the past two and a half years is the choice by 
culpable advisers to increase the assets under their management at the 
expense of their shareholders’ interests. 
 Of course, there are many benign and even affirmatively good 
explanations for the growth of assets in a mutual fund, and chief 
among them is an adviser’s canny investment decisions that have 
enlarged a fund to the benefit of all the shareholders.  Larger funds 
can, in theory, enjoy economies of scale from savings on transaction 
costs which may be shared among investors.226  These beneficent 
justifications for the growth of assets under management may help to 
disguise the advisers’ own profit, thereby allowing advisers to reap 
superoptimal value without detection.  In each of the mutual fund 
improprieties examined below,227 the advisers’ power to control the 
operations of the fund explains how they positioned themselves to 
extract rents from their shareholders.228 
                                                 
 226. Economies of scale may be passed on to shareholders in funds through the use of 
sales-load breakpoints.  That is, a fund may offer a discount on the sales charges it imposes 
on fund shares in proportion to the amount of a shareholder’s investment, such that the more 
money an investor puts into a fund, the less he or she has to pay in sales charges.  If an 
investor invests $100,000 in a fund, for instance, his or her sales load may be 3.75%; but if he 
or she increases the investment to $500,000, the load will drop to 2.00%.  One of the 
improprieties that recently came to light involves investment advisers failing to honor these 
breakpoints and not giving large shareholders their appropriate discounts. 
 227. Abuses have also been reported in yet other areas of the fund industry, such as 
529 plans.  Recently, the state of Utah f ired the head of its 529 plan and accused him 
of stealing money earmarked for the plan.  Dale Hatch, deputy executive director 
of the state’s higher education assistance authority, has been accused of 
committing fraud by skimming money budgeted for administering the plan and 
putting it into 529 accounts he owned.  See Jane J. Kim, Director of “529” Plan Is 
Dismissed, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at C15. 
 228. Please note that some of the following discussions regarding abuses use 
hypothetical fact patterns to illustrate the species of malfeasance in question.  Others, 
however, are based on the specific allegations contained in settlement orders signed by 
regulators and investment advisers.  As those settlement agreements rarely contain 
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A. Market-Timing 
 One allegation that featured prominently at the initial press 
conference in which Eliot Spitzer declared malfeasance in mutual 
funds was market-timing.229  Unlike some of the behavior that has 
subsequently been alleged, market-timing is not illegal per se.230  
Indeed, in some respects, the timing of entrances and exists from the 
market has been a strategy long encouraged by prudent investors—
after all, much market behavior is governed by certain cyclical trends, 
so taking account of that calendar is only reasonable and certainly not 
against the law.  Herein lies one of the sources of confusion with this 
topic:  the term “market-timing” has no fixed definition in the 
extensive investment advisory literature and regulations.  As investiga-
tions by the SEC and others evolved, however, regulators eventually 
made clear that the market-timing of which they disapproved 
encompassed a variety of investing techniques involving arbitrage of 
mutual fund share prices through the use of timed transactions.231 
 Perhaps the best example of market-timing involves time-zone 
arbitrage, a strategy in which investors attempt to exploit inefficiencies 
in the pricing of mutual fund shares by scheduling investments 
according to the behavior of markets across far reaches of the globe.232  
Consider, for instance, an American mutual fund whose portfolio of 
underlying securities consists solely of a diverse array of Japanese 
equity securities traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  At 4:00 p.m. 
Eastern time each business day, the fund must determine its NAV by 
calculating the value of its Japanese holdings (and then adding to that 
figure any other assets the fund owns, subtracting any liabilities, and 
dividing that number by the number of fund shares outstanding).  The 
easiest, and often most reliable, indication of the worth of any publicly 
traded security, Japanese or otherwise, is the price at which it last 
traded on a public securities exchange.  The American fund therefore 
would, in all likelihood, use the closing price on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange for their Japanese securities to determine its own NAV. 
                                                 
 229. See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, supra note 1. 
 230. See Disclosure Regarding Market-timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio 
Holdings, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300, 22,301-05 
(Apr. 23, 2004). 
 231. See id.; see also text accompanying and sources cited supra note 21 (discussing 
specific settlements with MFS and Alliance). 
 232. Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual 
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 The potential problems with using the Japanese closing price 
become very apparent when one considers that the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange closes at 1:00 a.m. Eastern time233—fully fourteen hours 
before the American fund calculates its NAV.  Imagine, for instance 
that at 3:00 a.m. Eastern time, a massive earthquake strikes the city of 
Kobe in Japan.  Or, on the other hand, that at 4:00 a.m. Eastern time, 
the Japanese central bank lowers interest rates by a full point more than 
expected.  In either case, the Tokyo Stock Exchange will not open—
and therefore not be capable of reflecting these important 
developments—until 8:00 p.m. Eastern time, four hours after the 
American fund must calculate its NAV.  In essence, by using the 
closing prices (which predate news that will certainly move the 
market) for its Japanese stocks, the American fund is trapped in time 
and operating in the past. 
 To a savvy investor, news of the earthquake or the drop in interest 
rates presents an ideal opportunity to arbitrage.  By selling shares of 
the American fund on bad news, the investor will exit the fund before 
the price of the fund’s shares drop, thereby avoiding a certain loss.  By 
buying shares on good news, the investor will enter the fund before the 
price of the fund’s shares rise, thereby locking in guaranteed gains.  
After all, the American fund will not react to these developments until 
the following day, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange will have opened, 
moved significantly up or down, and closed again.  If an investor is 
poised and ready to move huge sums of money into and out of the 
American fund, it can garner significant profits through this strategy. 
 Mutual funds are, of course, advised by savvy portfolio managers 
who are not unaware of these investing techniques.  Those managers 
are not bound in any way to use stale closing prices to calculate the 
fund’s NAV.  In fact, on the contrary, they are obliged to value their 
portfolio securities fairly, which means that they can depart from 
closing prices if those values are manifestly inaccurate.234  In such 
instances, a fund may retain the services of a third-party pricing 
consultant that specializes in ascribing a fair value to securities—or 
any other portfolio holdings—for which market prices are not readily 
available or, in the aforementioned examples, for which market prices 
                                                 
 233. See Tokyo Stock Exchange Web site, http://www.tse.or.jp./English/index.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 234. See Ciccotello, supra note 97, ¶¶ 33-35; see also infra text accompany notes 245-
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do not accurately reflect true value.235  While any experienced portfolio 
manager can anticipate the effects that an earthquake or interest-rate 
adjustment will have on the market and can, accordingly, deploy fair 
valuation strategies to counterbalance those effects, many more subtle 
events that are harder to obviate can also present opportunities for 
arbitrage. 
 Market-timing arbitrageurs do not wait impotently for acts of 
God to present them with chances to make money.  They have learned 
how to interpret and exploit the effects of much more nuanced 
occurrences.  Even the movement of other world markets, for instance, 
could create predictable effects on a broad index of Japanese securities.  
Imagine that after the close of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the New 
York Stock Exchange were to rise a certain percentage on the strength 
of positive developments in the U.S. economy.  Such a rally would, 
with a certain degree of correlation, impact the other markets in the 
world.  Thus, market timers can again move their funds into or out of 
funds accordingly.236 
 Of course, market-timing is not illegal per se.  Indeed, some 
might argue that markets benefit from arbitrage, which encourages 
greater pricing accuracy.  Nevertheless, the market-timing of mutual 
funds is not harmless.  Market timers extract profits, and avoid losses, 
at the expense of longer-term shareholders who have not moved their 
assets in and out of the fund.237  By moving large blocks of cash into a 
fund in anticipation of a rise in the fund’s value, the market timer 
dilutes the worth of each individual share of the fund.238  Although the 
timer’s new cash was not invested in the underlying securities whose 
value has risen, the investment has increased the number of fund 
shares outstanding.239  Thus, with a greater denominator, the NAV 
equation results in profits from positive market movements being 
shared by a greater number of shareholders.240 
 In addition, the rapid movements of large amounts of cash in and 
out of a mutual fund create inefficiencies in the management of the 
                                                 
 235. The leading provider of third-party fair valuation services is Investment 
Technology Group, Inc., which markets its ITG Fair Value Model as “an independent, reliable 
way to establish fair value prices.  In historical buck-tests of actual portfolios, the ITG Fair 
Value Model has significantly reduced the opportunity for market-timing by generating price 
adjustments that better approximate the next trade of fund holdings.”  See Investment 
Technology Group, http://www.itginc.com/research/fvm.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006)). 
 236. See Ciccotello et al., supra note 97, ¶¶ 8-10. 
 237. See id. ¶¶ 8-11. 
 238. See id. ¶¶ 16-20. 
 239. See id. 
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fund.241  With the arrival of $20 million, for example, in a $100 million 
fund, the portfolio manager must scramble to invest the cash to 
maximize investment returns in the fund.  Similarly, if a timer redeems 
$20 million from the same fund, the portfolio manager may have to 
liquidate certain positions before an opportune moment to sell.  Such 
timing movements also come with transaction costs shared by all 
shareholders of the fund.  Economically, then, market-timing is 
deleterious to the interests of long-term shareholders.  For that reason, 
many investment advisers prohibit market-timing in their mutual funds 
and proscribe such activity in their funds’ prospectuses.242 
 Because market-timing is lucrative, however, certain arbitrageurs 
are willing to “pay” for the opportunity to do it.  In exchange for the 
ability to move $25 million rapidly in and out of a particular fund, for 
instance, a market timer might offer to leave untouched $50 million of 
“sticky” assets in a different fund in the adviser’s complex.243  Such an 
arrangement, of course, pits the interests of the shareholders of the 
timed fund against the interests of shareholders in the fund with sticky 
assets.  More importantly, though, this arrangement pits the adviser’s 
financial interest against its shareholders’ interest.  Although the 
shareholders of the timed fund will forfeit value to the market timer, 
the adviser will garner higher advisory fees from the additional sticky 
assets under management.  While an adviser may allow investors to 
market time its funds without running afoul of the law, it cannot do so 
in violation of its own prospectus.  Thus, the advisers who faced 
prosecution by the SEC and other regulators in connection with this 
activity were those who publicly claimed that they did not allow 
market-timing while furtively striking deals with hedge funds and 
other investors to facilitate it.244 
B. Fair Valuation 
 As the market-timing abuses demonstrate, one key function that 
an investment adviser must regularly perform is the valuation of each 
                                                 
 241. See id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
 242. See Mass. Fin. Servs., File No. 3-1193 (Feb. 5, 2004), Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2213, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm (setting forth 
a total settlement of $225 million). 
 243. A market timer may offer to park the sticky assets in a fund, such as a hedge fund, 
that provides the investment adviser with a substantially higher management fee than the fund 
that is being timed. 
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of its fund’s portfolios.245  In essence, this process calls for the adviser 
to calculate its own fees.  If the adviser concludes that the fund’s assets 
are worth a great deal, it will receive more revenues from advisory 
fees; if it concludes that they are worth less, it will receive less.  
Needless to say, the adviser’s incentive to inflate the value of the fund’s 
assets is manifest. 
 The urge and ability to manipulate the value of a fund’s portfolio 
is diminished a great deal by the use of objective market quotations for 
underlying securities, as any competent audit would quickly uncover 
fraud on the part of the adviser.  When an adviser departs from market 
quotations, the risk of arbitrariness—or worse, bias—in the valuation 
of the portfolio becomes pronounced.  Thus, fund boards maintain a 
pricing committee whose responsibility is to oversee any assets for 
which market quotations are not readily available.246 
 One such asset is a security for which available market prices are 
obviously stale.247  Others include portfolio holdings that are highly 
illiquid, such as investments in companies that are not publicly traded.  
If a company that is not publicly traded last sold its shares in a private 
placement a long time in the past, an adviser and the pricing 
committee may have a difficult time determining a fair value for those 
                                                 
 245. See Alison Sahoo, SEC:  Fair Valuation Guidance Coming Soon, IGNITES, Aug. 5, 
2004, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20040805/fair_valuation_guidance_coming_ 
soon.htm. 
 246. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § (a)(41)(B), Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B) (2000)); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2005); Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 118 (1994); 
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Accounting Standards No. 113 (1992). 
 247. Independent trustees—in addition to inside counsel, compliance officers, and 
accountants—have been held liable for their failure to fulfill their valuation duties.  In 1998, 
the SEC for the first time named independent trustees in a cease-and-desist proceeding when 
it filed charges against Parnassus Investments, investment adviser to the Parnassus Fund.  An 
administrative law judge subsequently held that the independent trustees had aided and 
abetted the overstatement of the fund’s NAV by failing to value appropriately the fund’s 
investment in Margaux, Inc., of which it owned 565,000 shares of common stock and a 
$100,000 note convertible into 1.5 million additional shares.  Parnassus Investments, et al., 
Initial Decision Release No. 131, Administrative Proceeding, File no. 3-9317, 1998 SEC 
LEXIS 1877 (Sept. 3, l998).  Throughout a two-year period in the early 1990s, the fund had 
ascribed an identical value to its Margaux investment, notwithstanding a series of negative 
events that occurred during that time, including the company’s bankruptcy, its delisting from 
NASDAQ, and an investigative report linking Margaux’s products to the sale of spoiled meat 
by its largest customer.  Id.  At the end of the two-year period, the fund eventually did reduce 
its carrying value of the Margaux investment from $0.344 to $0.20 per share when Morgan 
Stanley downgraded the customer’s shares from “buy” to “hold.” Id.  The following year, the 
fund further reduced the carrying value of its investment to $0.15 per share as a result of 
further financial difficulties at Margaux.  Id.  Ultimately, the fund sold its investment in 
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shares.  Unless the board and its pricing committee pay close attention 
to these determinations, an adviser might be tempted to inflate values 
of these holdings.  Any affirmative decision to increase the value of a 
holding is likely to draw attention, but an adviser can achieve a similar 
effect by failing to reduce the value of a stock that clearly has fallen. 
 Imagine a privately held biotechnology company.248  If a mutual 
fund were to purchase shares in the company immediately following 
successful clinical trials of a flagship treatment, one might expect the 
fund to pay a premium for the company’s shares.  If six months pass 
without any additional round of fundraising or other valuation event 
for the company, the fund’s adviser might be justified in continuing to 
carry the investment at the same value.  If the Food and Drug 
Administration were then to refuse to approve the company’s 
treatment, any reasonable observer would conclude that the value of 
the company’s equity—and any investment in it—had fallen, 
regardless of whether the company records such a decline overtly as a 
result of the sale of any more of its shares.  Under such circumstances, 
if the fund’s adviser failed to adjust the value of its investment 
downward, the fund’s assets under management would be artificially 
inflated.  Shareholders in the fund would, therefore, be paying too 
much for the adviser’s services. 
 As a general matter, the procedures by which an adviser prices its 
illiquid holdings and uses a fair valuation service are monitored by the 
board of trustees.  Given the duties of the board, the trustees’ other 
commitments, and the number of securities in which a fund complex is 
invested, however, one must wonder to what extent a pricing 
committee is capable of monitoring all the external developments that 
could affect the true value of the funds’ portfolios.  Certainly, the 
adviser’s control of the pricing of fund assets gives it the ability to 
manipulate these equations to its own financial benefit. 
C. Late-Trading 
 Together with market-timing, Eliot Spitzer in his watershed press 
conference also accused mutual fund advisers of facilitating late-
trading.249  Like market-timing, late-trading allows investors to time 
their movement in and out of mutual funds, typically on the heels of 
breaking news; unlike market-timing, however, late-trading is 
unequivocally illegal.  Late-trading is the practice of placing or 
                                                 
 248. See id. 
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canceling orders to buy or sell mutual fund shares after the 4:00 p.m. 
deadline (as of when mutual funds determine their NAV).250 
 Mutual fund shares are priced once a day, after the close of the 
market.251  Law-abiding investors who wish to purchase shares in a 
fund can place an order during business hours and will receive the 
fund’s next available price, which is that day’s NAV.  Imagine a 
hypothetical situation in which Bank of America announces, a few 
minutes after the close of the market, that it is acquiring Fleet Bank.  
One can safely assume that, upon the opening of the market the next 
morning, the value of shares in Fleet will rise.  If one had placed an 
order during business hours to buy shares of a mutual fund heavily 
invested in Fleet, the news would have no impact on that day’s NAV, 
which was calculated as of 4:00 p.m. using closing prices that had not 
yet reflected the merger announcement.  Of course, the next day’s NAV 
would almost certainly rise to reflect the increase in Fleet shares, and a 
lucky investor could sell his or her shares the following day to realize 
that gain.252 
 Some investors, however, are not interested in being lucky.  If 
they purchased shares in the fund after the merger announcement, and 
yet still received the stale NAV, they could be assured of enjoying an 
easy profit from the bounce in share price.  The process by which 
funds price their shares creates administrative gaps into which 
unscrupulous investors can place late trades.  The process of gathering 
a day’s orders to buy and sell a fund is not instantaneous; it takes time, 
often several hours.  During that time, brokers and other financial 
intermediaries are gathering and relaying their clients’ orders to each 
mutual fund’s administrator.  At various steps along the way, an 
intermediary or the investment adviser can insert an extra order, or 
delete one.  As with market-timing, if a fund’s underlying securities 
rise in value, cash from newly arrived investors only dilutes the gains 
that would otherwise have been enjoyed by the existing shareholders.253  
                                                 
 250. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50,360, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,595 (Sept. 14, 2004) (setting forth SEC allegations 
of late-trading). 
 251. See Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388, 70,390-91 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003). 
 252. Although the facts used in this example are hypothetical, actual late-trading 
allegations are set forth in settlement agreements entered into by the SEC and a number of 
financial intermediaries.  See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co., Securities Exchange Release No. 
50,360, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,595 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50360.htm. 
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So, like market-timing, facilitating late-trading breaches the adviser’s 
fiduciary duties. 
 Of course, pulling or placing late trades would also be an 
extremely generous favor for an investment adviser to perform for 
valued customers.  An adviser could use such a strategy to retain and 
entice large investors to its funds, which would naturally increase the 
assets under management in its funds.  Here, again, the adviser’s 
managerial influence in the operations of its funds creates an 
opportunity for it to extract additional value from shareholders.254 
D. Selective Disclosure 
 Another douceur that an investment adviser could offer to its 
favored customers as a way to entice them to deposit their assets in the 
adviser’s funds is particularized information about the precise portfolio 
holdings of the adviser’s mutual funds.255  While funds must disclose 
certain information about their top holdings in SEC filings, such 
disclosure is incomplete and infrequent.256  Often, the investing public 
learns of a fund’s holdings only well after the fact, at which point the 
information is too stale to exploit. 
 If an investor learns contemporaneously about the holdings or, 
even better, in advance, he or she can take advantage of that knowledge 
by “front-running” the fund.257  Consider, for example, an investor who 
knows that a large mutual fund has a goal of maintaining ten percent of 
its assets in Microsoft and rebalances its holdings each month.  If the 
investor then learns that the fund’s holdings of Microsoft have dropped 
to eight percent toward the end of the month, he or she can readily 
ascertain that the fund will soon have to make a large purchase of 
Microsoft stock to adhere to its investing policies.  An investor with the 
ability and inclination might aim to buy as much Microsoft stock as 
possible before the mutual fund does; that is, to front run the fund’s 
purchase.  Then, when the mutual fund, with its billions of dollars, 
begins buying huge blocks of the stock, the value of the shares will rise 
as a natural consequence of the purchasing activity.  The investor in 
possession of the selectively disclosed fund information will benefit 
                                                 
 254. See id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
 255. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
 256. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103, 240.10b5-1 to -2, 249.308 (2005). 
 257. See generally Samuel L. Hayes III, The Impact of Recombining Commercial and 
Investment Banking, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 49-50 (2004) (examining the current regulatory 
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from a quick and definite increase in its newly purchased securities.  
Of course, the converse phenomenon of avoiding losses is equally 
possible by selling shares prior to a fund’s large-scale liquidations. 
 These trades will raise the cost or lower the proceeds for the 
mutual fund that makes its transactions afterwards.  Accordingly, the 
shareholders of the fund will gain incrementally fewer profits or incur 
incrementally larger costs on the fund’s transactions.  These amounts 
may seem negligible to any given shareholder, but of course, therein 
lies the genius of extracting rents from mutual fund shareholders:  any 
particular act of exploitation may generate substantial profits to an ill-
behaving individual while ostensibly impacting each victim very little.  
As one journalist covering the behavior characterized it:  “If you want 
to steal a lot of money and get away with it, steal a little from a lot of 
people.  They will probably never notice.  If they do, they may not 
think it worth the effort to complain.”258 
 In this way, an investment adviser can dispense259 portfolio 
holding information as an incentive for sophisticated and wealthy 
investors to station their assets in the adviser’s funds, raising the 
adviser’s assets under management and, consequently, its advisory 
fees.260 
E. Revenue-Sharing 
 The business of investment management revolves primarily 
around two different categories of securities:  the shares of each mutual 
fund that the adviser markets to the investing public (fund shares), and 
the underlying investments that the adviser buys and sells in order to 
                                                 
 258. Floyd Norris, Pile of Pennies Is Adding up to a Scandal in Mutual Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at C1. 
 259. Of course, this behavior is essentially an investment advisory analog to insider 
trading.  Traders are making use of material nonpublic information.  See Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (“We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of 
investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.  Investors who see a security's 
price change dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for 
that move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.”). 
 260. A hybrid of malfeasance by selective disclosure and insider trading is illicit 
employee trading.  At the same time that an adviser can provide valuable information about 
portfolio holdings to its favored customers, it can also use the information for its own benefit.  
Or, more accurately, the adviser’s employees can take advantage of the information for their 
own benefit.  Portfolio managers, who are the employees of an investment adviser most 
intimately familiar with a fund’s holdings and future plans, can just as easily capitalize on 
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produce gains for shareholders in the fund (portfolio securities).261  
While an investor who wishes to participate in mutual funds may use a 
broker/dealer to purchase and redeem fund shares, so, too, will an 
investment adviser use a broker/dealer to buy and sell portfolio 
securities.  Indeed, the broker/dealer in the two sets of transactions may 
even be the same entity.262 
 If a portfolio manager decides that a mutual fund that he or she 
oversees should purchase $25 million worth of shares in Exxon-Mobil, 
for instance, the manager will relay the order to the investment 
adviser’s trading desk.  Employees at the trading desk will then contact 
broker/dealers about the purchase, and the broker/dealers will quote 
the trading desk prices at which they will execute the trade.  Those 
quotations may vary, such that the adviser would incur higher or lower 
transaction costs depending on which broker/dealer it selects to 
execute the trade.  Federal regulations impose upon the adviser a duty 
to use “best execution” in transactions on behalf of the fund’s 
shareholders.263  “Best,” however, does not necessarily mean 
“cheapest.”264 
 Imagine two quotations from two different broker/dealers.  The 
first offers to place the trade at five cents a share.  The second offers to 
place the trade at seven cents a share but includes with the bid a 
package of extensive research on the petrochemical industry.  If the 
value of the research it receives outweighs the cost of the additional 
two cents per share it will have to pay for the trade, an adviser might 
reasonably conclude that the second offer is “best.”  That research is a 
tool that the adviser can use to do a better job in its role as the manager 
of the fund’s assets, and Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act creates a 
safe harbor for advisers from liability for paying more than the lowest 
possible commission rate if the advisers use the additional 
commissions to pay for research services.265 
                                                 
 261. Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm:  Frequent Trading, Fund 
Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1277 
(2006) (“Unlike other securities, mutual fund shares are sold at a fixed price set by the fund 
based on the current net asset value of the fund’s portfolio securities.”). 
 262. See Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,341, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 6438, 6439 (Feb. 10, 2004). 
 263. See Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices, Release No. 34-
43,084, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,409 (Proposed Aug. 8, 2000). 
 264. See id. 
 265. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000); Securities, Brokerage and Research Services, 
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 The scope of Section 28(e), however, is quite limited.266  Advisers 
might be tempted to pay for all manner of services through inflated 
commission fees because they, in fact, are not the ones paying.  Mutual 
fund shareholders pay those transaction fees.  Consider an example:  In 
exchange for charging highly inflated commissions, a broker/dealer 
offers an investment adviser the use of commercial real estate to open 
a branch office.  Bear in mind that the adviser already receives a 
stream of revenues from which it must pay its operational expenses:  
the advisory fees it charges shareholders.  Under such an arrangement, 
the fund’s shareholders would be paying the adviser twice—once 
directly through advisory fees, then a second time in the form of 
inflated transaction costs. 
 When one considers the enormous volume of trading activity of 
portfolio securities in which investment advisers engage, the value of 
the commissions it pays quickly becomes evident.  While Section 
28(e) attempts to limit the manner of tangible inducements that 
broker/dealers can use to attract trading business, creative financial 
executives have nevertheless devised a particularly appealing offering 
that many advisers have been unable to resist:  “shelf space.”267  In the 
grocery business, one component that factors into the price a retail 
establishment pays a wholesale provider of goods is the prominence 
the retailer is willing to give those goods.  For example, if a cereal 
producer offers a grocery store a lower price, the store may be willing 
to place boxes of Chocolate Frosted Sugar Bombs268 at kids’-eye level. 
 As in the grocery business, prominent shelf space is highly prized 
in the investment advisory industry.  With thousands of mutual funds 
from which to choose, customers strolling the aisles of broker/dealers 
may need some assistance.  Morgan Stanley, for example, may 
therefore offer a list of twenty preferred mutual funds to its customers 
to help guide their decision.269  With such a prominent position, the 
funds on that list can be assured of a rise in sales of their fund shares.  
                                                 
 266. See Securities, Brokerage and Research Services, Release No. 34-23,170, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 16,004, 16,005 (Apr. 30, 1986). 
 267. The SEC uses the term “shelf space” to mean “heightened visibility within 
[broker/dealers’] distribution systems.”  Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2224, Investment Co. Act Release No. 26,409, SEC Docket 2036 (Mar. 31, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2224.htm. 
 268. The Calvin and Hobbes Searchable Database, http://www.trangsmogrifier.org/ch/ 
comics/search.cgi? (search “Chocolate Frosted Sugar Bombs”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2006). 
 269. Morgan Stanley was, in fact, implicated in revenue sharing wrongdoing by the 
SEC and settled the matter for $50 million.  See Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Securities Act 
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In consideration for the valuable shelf space—and the sale of fund 
shares sure to follow from it—an adviser might be willing to direct a 
good portion of its trading activity in portfolio securities to Morgan 
Stanley, even if Morgan Stanley’s commissions might not necessarily 
satisfy the requirements of best execution. 
 While the fund’s shareholders may pay inordinate transaction 
costs in such an arrangement, prominent shelf space will insure that 
money from new investors will flow into the fund.  As the assets under 
management rise, so too of course do the investment adviser’s fees.  
Thus, once again, advisers are faced with a conflict between their own 
interest and their shareholders’ interest, while the managerial power 
they wield over fund’s arcane trading activities gives them the ability to 
extract value surreptitiously at the shareholders’ expense. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The scope of illicit behavior uncovered in the investment 
management industry over the past two and a half years is 
breathtaking.  In creative and diverse ways, investment advisers have 
repeatedly used their control over vast sums of money to advance their 
own fiscal interests at the expense of the shareholders for whom they 
are fiduciaries.  While the nature of these abuses has varied widely—
from bargains with market timers to complicity with late traders to 
overpayments for trading commissions—one dynamic has almost 
always been involved.  Employees of the adviser used the power of 
their intimate knowledge of mutual fund operations to increase the 
assets they managed and thereby to enhance their own revenues, while 
a board of trustees without resources or influence stood by impotently. 
 The optimal contracting approach suggests optimistically that a 
well-crafted advisory agreement will harmonize the interests of the 
adviser and the shareholders but fails to account for this type of self-
dealing behavior by the adviser.  The managerial power hypothesis, 
however, when extended in a novel approach from the executive 
compensation paradigm to the investment advisory context, explains 
why and how advisers had both the motive and the opportunity for 
extracting rents from shareholders in this bacchanal of malfeasance. 
 In response to the deluge of improprieties, the SEC and other 
authorities have already passed a number of new regulations.270  By and 
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large, though, these new rules do not proscribe the behavior of advisers 
so much as demand more disclosure.  In the view of the SEC, the 
problem with market-timing, for example, was not so much the 
practice as the failure to disclose what was really happening.  Yet 
mutual fund shareholders are already overwhelmed by hundreds of 
pages of disclosure and hardly have an interest in reading more fine 
print about what their advisers may be doing.  In fact, the current 
disclosure regime is so excessive that the SEC is once again 
considering overhauling its forms to rejuvenate a system that has 
grown clogged by so many new regulations. 
 To be effective, of course, any additional regulation requires 
additional oversight.  But while the SEC’s budget is scheduled to 
remain unchanged this fiscal year, a new rule will soon take effect that 
will bring hedge fund advisers under regulatory review.271  With 
thousands of new advisers and funds to monitor, how can the SEC 
possibly increase its vigilance of mutual funds? 
 With trillions of dollars already under management and untold 
more possibly to come some day through Social Security reform,272 the 
industry must embrace changes beyond the merely cosmetic.  The 
depth and breadth of the recent irregularities strongly suggests that 
superficial patches will not be a long-term solution. 
                                                                                                             
(July 9, 2004); Company Act Release No. 26299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 17, 2003); 
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